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Descent and Distribution-Validity of Marriage
In Mitchell v. Smyser,' which was an action for partition,
the issue became one of ownership, dependant upon the de-
termination of which one of two women was the lawful wife
of the intestate whose lands were in suit. No novel question
appears in the case. The plaintiff, who alleged that she was
the legitimate daughter of the intestate through common-law
marriage of her mother, was met with a contention by cer-
tain of the defendants that they were the only lawful children
and heirs of the intestate. The plaintiff did not claim that
the resisting defendants were illegitimate. The master's
finding was that the defendants' mother was the common law
wife of the intestate by an earlier marriage, that she sur-
vived him, and that the plaintiff was therefore not a lawful
heir. The lower court upheld the master, and it in turn was
sustained by the Supreme Court. The Court noted that the
issue being one at law, it would not disturb the factual con-
clusions which had been reached, there being evidence reason-
ably tending to support them.2 At all three levels of the case
judicial notice was taken of the fact that at all times prior
to the intestate's death divorce was not permitted in South
Carolina, and, that being so, the survival of the defendants'
mother precluded the possibility of the validity of the mar-
riage of the plaintiff's mother.
Executors and Administrators-Claim
In Galphin v. Wells,3 actions were brought in the court of
common pleas against the personal representatives of the
estates of three sisters and the beneficiaries under their wills
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 236 S. C. 332, 114 S. E. 2d 226 (1960).
2. Citing Campbell v. Christian, 235 S. C. 102, 110 S. E. 2d 1 (1959);
Johnson v. Johnson, 235 S. C. 542, 110 S. E. 2d 922 (1959), both of which
were cases at law, dealing with the factual issue of marriage. Even if
the issue in the present case had been equitable because of the generally
equitable nature of the partition suit, the xesult would probably have
been the same because of the concurrence of the findings of the master
and the trial judge. Large v. Large, 232 S. C. 70, 100 S. E. 2d 825 (1957) ;
Galphin v. Wells, 236 S. C. 606, 115 S. E. 2d 288 (1960), discussed next.
3. 236 S. C. 606, 115 S. E. 2d 288 (1960).
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seeking recovery for services allegedly rendered by the plain-
tiff to the decedents. By consent, the answer in one of the
actions was treated as the answer in all three, and the matter
was referred, also by consent, to a referee. He filed a re-
port adverse, on the facts, to the plaintiff's claim, and the
circuit judge upheld the report. The Supreme Court, observ-
ing that the case had been treated by agreement as one in
equity, affirmed the lower court on the basis of the concur-
rent findings below, in view of the rule that "the factual
findings will not be disturbed unless such findings are with-
out evidence to support them or are against a clear pre-
ponderance thereof."
Construction
The rule that, as a matter of construction, words in a
will are to be given their ordinary meaning and technical
terms are to be given their technical meaning, unless the con-
trary appears, is referred to with approval in Smoak v.
McClure.4 The case is fully discussed under the heading of
Property. Although the instrument therein was a deed, the
Supreme Court adverts to the rule as being applicable alike
to wills and deeds.
Joint Account-Construction of Wil--Validity
The question of the nature, effect and validity of joint
bank accounts which are intended, or may operate, to give
the survivor the right to the account is treated here in the
subject of Wills because of their resemblance to testamentary
dispositions. Although possibly regarded in the earlier cases
as an attempted, and ineffectual, testamentary disposition
insofar as there was intent to create ownership in the donee-
survivor,5 the joint account or deposit was later recognized
in Hawkins v. Thackston0 as being non-testamentary and
4. 236 S. C. 548, 115 S. E. 2d 55 (1960).
5. Sawyer v. Mabus, 107 S. C. 369, 92 S. E. 1029 (1917); Smith v.
Planters Bank, 124 S. C. 100, 117 S. E. 312 (1922).
6. 224 S. C. 445, 79 S. E. 714 (1954). The term "joint account or
deposit" is rather loosely used in connection with this and the two pre-
ceding cases, and is not to be taken necessarily as creating a joint tenancy
or estate. In both Sawyer v. Mabus and Smith v. Planters Bank the ac-
count (certificate of deposit) ran to A or B. A right created in the
alternative is several, not joint. Leaving aside the intent to benefit the
non-depositing survivor, a joint tenancy or estate could not, with such
words, arise. The same could be said to be true of Hawkins v. Thackston,
where the account was payable to A or B. Although the survivor was
228 [Vol. 14
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sustainable on the theory of a third-party beneficiary con-
tract: the survivor was entitled to the fund provided there
was donative intent. In Austin v. Summers,7 decided in the
period under review, the Supreme Court recognized and
sanctioned the application of the contract theory,8 but the
case offered unusual complexities in that the account was
created by the depositor not (as ordinarily) in his name and
that of another, but in his name and the names of two others.
The facts need recounting in some detail.
The original owner of the funds deposited (or became a
shareholder to the extent of) approximately $10,000 in a sav-
ings and loan association in the names of himself and his wife.
Later, he extinguished the account in these names and sub-
stituted the names of himself, his wife and his daughter by
an earlier marriage (the defendant). The account was en-
titled "Joseph T. Fry, Janie A. Fry and Irene F. Summers,
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship." The deposit
or share book contained an entry to the same effect. At the
time the book was issued the three parties signed an agree-
ment that they applied for membership in the association
"as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and not as
tenants in common, and not as tenants by the entirety."9 The
agreement provided, among other things, that the association
was directed to pay to any one or more of the joint tenants
on their signatures, and "to pay, without any liability for
such payment, to any one or the survivor or survivors at any
time." It was further provided that any additions made by
one should be regarded as a gift to the others to the extent
of their pro-rata interest in the account.
The donor also had a savings account and a checking
account in a bank in another city, also joint in nature, pay-
allowed to take, there could not be, in this light, a joint tenancy. That
an account running to persons in the alternative does not create a joint
tenancy, see 7 Ai. JuR. Banks § 425 (1937); 48 A. L. R. 189, 204 (1927).
Nor is it necessary in order to create a right of survivorship that a
joint tenancy be established. 66 A. L. R. 189 (1930).
7. 237 S. C. 613, 118 S. E. 2d 684 (1961).
8. In Hawkins v. Thackston supra, note 6, the Court likened the con-
tract to a third-party beneficiary contract-rights resembling those of a
beneficiary under a policy of life insurance. In the present case the
agreement was between the depositor, the donees and the bank. This would
not be a third-party beneficiary contract, since, although one person fur-
nished the consideration (made the deposit) the promise ran directly
to him and to the donees. Consideration need not be furnished by the
promisee. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS, § 75(2) (1932).
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able to "J. T. Fry or Mrs. Janie Austin Fry or Mrs. Irene
Summers."'10 The total of these accounts was approximately
$5,500.
The donor died, leaving a will in which the defendant was
named executrix. The will was duly probated. It gave the
entire estate, after debts, to his wife
for and during the term of her natural life to have the
full use and enjoyment thereof for her maintenance and
support and pleasure, and upon the death of my wife...
I give.., all of the remainder of my said property to my
daughter ... to be her absolute property in fee simple.
... It is my request and I desire that my said daughter
• .. take charge of and handle for the pleasure, main-
tenance and support of my said wife . . . all of said
property bequeathed and devised.., and provide for my
said wife such comfortable living as said property will
afford."
Shortly after the donor's death the daughter withdrew the
$10,000 on deposit in the association and deposited it in a
North Carolina institution in her own name. She did not
withdraw the bank accounts but included them in her listing
of the assets of the estate. A considerable time after the
withdrawal of the $10,000, a demand was made by the wife on
the defendant for $5,000-, that is, half. It was not granted.
Shortly afterwards the wife died, and the plaintiff, ad-
ministrator of her estate, brought the present action. The
complaint sought recovery of the entire $10,000, alleging that
the defendant had been added as a payee only for the con-
venience of her father and his wife, and not as an intended
donee. The defendant's answer denied the assertion of her
designation as for convenience and contended that the account
being in favor of the survivor, she, as the ultimate survivor,
was entitled to the whole fund. As a further defense, the
defendant asserted that if the plaintiff were entitled to any-
thing, the defendant had a right of set-off for moneys spent
by her to pay debts of her father's estate, and for sums
advanced to the plaintiff's intestate, and for the payment
after her death of debts, burial expenses and expenses of the
last illness.
10. See the observations in note 6.
11. Record ff. 41-43.
[Vol. 14
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss2/6
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
The plaintiff filed a reply, denying the validity of the
set-off or counterclaim, admitted only that Joseph T. Fry
had died, and demanded strict proof of the defendant's al-
legations.
The case was submitted to a special referee. He filed his
report, adverse to the defendant in the main (the details
follow). The circuit judge's decree (noted in detail here-
after) sustained the defendant's exceptions. The Supreme
Court, without comment, declared only that "The Report of
the Special Referee correctly disposes of the questions pre-
sented and is adopted as the opinion of the Court." It thereby,
in effect, reversed the lower court.
The referee found that the addition of the defendant was
with donative intent, and not for the convenience of the de-
positor or as an agency,12 and that, under the contract theory
formulated in Hawkins v. Thackston'3 an effective right to
take beneficially as a survivor had been created in her. He
concluded that "Janie Austin Fry and Irene Summers took
said account, as joint owners thereof, with right of survivor-
ship upon the death of Joseph T. Fry." Having thus char-
acterized the nature of the rights created, the referee stated
the issue to be whether the defendant had the right as against
the wife to withdraw the entire account, and what the effect
of the withdrawal and failure to pay over on the wife's de-
mand were. He concluded that there was no such right in the
defendant-either to withdraw or to retain-, and that the
defendant had committed a "conversion," rendering her liable
to the extent of $5,000 to Mrs. Fry, and on her death to her
administrator, the plaintiff. The report stated:
12. Although not impossible, an agency is unlikely where the account
runs to "A or B or the survivor," or where survivorship is otherwise
indicated. Since an agency is terminated by death of the principal (the
depositor), and the convenience of the depositor would end with his death,
a reasonable inference would be that no agency was intended. There
are cases, however, elsewhere in which survivorship was indicated, but
there was finding that the joining of the other party by the depositor
was for convenience. See CoRsiN, CONTRACTS § 914 (1950) Supp. (1961).
The agreement between the three parties and the association itself in-
dicates the donative feature of the initial and subsequent deposits. The
question may well arise as to what extent parol evidence may be ad-
missible to show a contrary intent. See 48 C. J. S. Joint Tenancy §
3 (1955); 2 AMEraICtA LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.4 (Casner ed. 1952). Gen-
erally as to admissibility of parol evidence relating to joint deposits,
see 33 A. L. I. (2) 569 (1924).
13. Supra, note 6.
19621
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Janie Austin Fry and Irene Summers had substantial
and equal interests in this account following the death of
Joseph T. Fry. Neither had contributed the money mak-
ing up this account which, under several decisions, gives
the contributing party greater rights of withdrawal
without liability .... When it has been established that
both parties have substantial interests in a joint account,
it follows that neither can appropriate the whole with-
out liability to the other.
The referee proceeded to declare that the deposit contract
undoubtedly authorized the defendant to withdraw the entire
amount without liability on the part of the savings and loan
association, an act sanctioned by § 8-602 of the 1952 Code,
14
but that
the power to withdraw is one thing and the power or
right to destroy a co-interest is another. The removal
of this account in full by Irene Summers and redeposit
of same in her own name in North Carolina, clearly
placed the money, or any part of it, outside the control
and possession of Janie Austin Fry and beyond her
reach. As a joint tenant (italics supplied) having a sub-
stantial interest in this account, Janie Austin Fry could
have terminated the account by a withdrawal of one-half
thereof, or by a voluntary partition or agreement with
her co-owner. She was entitled to withdraw one-half of
the account without becoming liable in any way to Irene
Summers and Irene Summers could have withdrawn
her half share (italics supplied) in like manner. Had
Janie Austin Fry taken no action to sever this account,
or to claim any part thereof during her lifetime, it can-
not be questioned but that Irene Summers, as the sur-
vivor, would have taken the entire account on the death
of Janie Austin Fry. ... Had Janie Austin Fry lived,
she could have enforced this demand by a partition ac-
tion or, if the money had not been removed from the
joint account, by merely withdrawing her share. Clearly,
14. The statute referring to savings and building and loan associations
makes provision, as does its counterpart relating to banks, CoD. OF LAWS
Or SOUTH CAROLINA § 8-171 (1952), to accounts in the names of "two
persons" and not to two or more. A reasonable interpretation would
probably include the latter in the purview of the act. It is arguable, how-
ever, that a bank or association under the statutes would be justified
only in paying to all the survivors and not to a single one of them. The




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol14/iss2/6
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
she wanted her share and was rightfully entitled to same,
but she was prevented from obtaining same by the action
of Irene Summers in removing the money to an individ-
ual account in another State.
(Comment on this phase of the report-by adoption, the
opinion of the Supreme Court-will be noted after reference
to the lower court's decree).
As to the issues posed in the dealings with the bank ac-
counts and the will of Joseph T. Fry, the referee found that
the accounts had been in the names of "J. T. Fry or Mrs.
Janie Austin Fry or Mrs. Irene Summers."' 5 The deposit
card provided "Depositor hereby agrees that funds deposited
in this account are owned jointly by the undersigned, sub-
ject to withdrawal by either or both, and that at the death
of either, the survivor shall take absolute and single owner-
ship of the net balance then remaining." He also found that
these accounts had been returned as assets of J. T. Fry's
estate and that they had been used in part for payment of
his debts; that a portion had been used in making monthly
payments totaling $1,800 to Mrs. Fry; and that other amounts
had been expended by the defendant for her stepmother's
benefit-payment of debts and funeral expenses. The referee
concluded that ordinarily the result would be that on 3. T.
Fry's death the wife and daughter would be entitled individ-
ually as survivors to the accounts, but that Janie Austin Fry
having acquiesced in the defendant's treatment of the fund
as an estate asset-influenced perhaps by the fact that it
was used for her (Janie Fry's) benefit-would be estopped
(as would those succeeding her) to assert any interest under
the fund as created under the original contract of deposit.
The defendant similarly, by her conduct, was held to have
waived any individual rights in the deposits and in effect to
have transferred any such rights into the estate.
A contention by the plaintiff (precisely when it was made
does not appear) that the will of 3. T. Fry was invalid and
not entitled to probate was dismissed by the referee, on the
ground that, as an attack on the will, it came too late, that is,
after the time for contest prescribed by statute had expired. 16
15. See comments in footnotes 6 and 10.
16. This conclusion is clearly correct. See the late case of Wooten v.
Wooten, 235 S. C. 228, 110 S. E. 2d (1960); Davis v. Davis, 214 S. C.
247, 52 S. E. 2d 192 (1949), cited by the referee; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson,
1962]
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The defendant had contended that under the will Janie
Austin Fry had only a life estate limited to income or interest,
and that for that reason any money furnished by the de-
fendant over that amount was an outlay of individual funds
entitling her to a corresponding set-off or recoupment. The
contention was rejected by the referee. His holding was that
the wife's interest was not so limited, but that she was en-
titled out of the estate to whatever was necessary for her
maintenance; and accordingly, that the funds so used were
estate funds to which the defendant had no right to re-
imbursement. With respect, however, to payments made by
the defendant to meet obligations of the wife not connected
with her maintenance, and for the wife's funeral expenses,
it was concluded that they were not covered by the will, and
as to them the defendant was entitled to a set-off.17 A fur-
ther contention that the wife was not entitled to participate
at all because of the precatory character of the words of the
will was dismissed, the referee concluding that despite the
use of the terms "request" and "desire" the context was not
precatory but created an obligation upon the defendant.
To the referee's report both parties excepted. The circuit
judge held, as had the referee, that there was donative in-
tent, and that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship
had been created; but he differed from the referee with
respect to the fate of the fund withdrawn from the associa-
tion. In substance his determination was that the referee
once having concluded that there was a joint tenancy with
178 S. C. 194, 182 S. E. 640 (1935) ; Hembree v. Bolton, 132 S. C. 136,
128 S. E. 841 (1925). The statute, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §
19-255 (1952), is plain to the point. But of greater relevance is the fact
that in this case the contention of invalidity of the willl would be in the
nature of a collateral attack and forbidden. Davis v. Davis, supra; Wilkin-
son v. Wilkinson, supra; Hembree v. Bolton, supra; Hammett v. Hammett,
38 S. C. 50, 16 S. E. 839 (1892); Weinberg v. Weinberg, 208 S. C. 157,
7 S. E. 2d 507 (1946); Thompson v. Thompson, 208 S. C. 208, 37 S. E. 2d
581 (1946). Even if the time for attacking the will had not expired, the
question of its validity could not be raised except by direct attack through
proceedings in solemn form. See the cases just cited, and in addition Gib-
son v. Brown, 1 N. & McC. 326 (1818) ; Davis v. Port, 3 Brev. 197 (1815) ;
Rosborough v. Hemphill, 5 Rich. Eq. 95 (1852); Ward v. Glenn, 9 Rich.
L. 127 (1855); Myers v. O'Hanlon, 12 Rich. Eq. 196 (1861).
17. The pertinent provisions of the will touching this issue are set out
earlier. See the text noting footnote 11. The language as a whole seems
to create a trust, with the defendant as trustee and the wife as bene-
ficiary, limiting the latter's interest to her lifetime but not restricted to
income. As to the extent of a beneficiary's interest, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 128, comment e (1959). It is there suggested that
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right of survivorship, he was in error in treating in effect
the tenancy as one in common-since the referee had held
that each party had the right to withdraw an equal portion.
As to the defendant's withdrawal of the entire fund, the
decree declared that "The fact that the defendant took the
funds into her possession after the death of Joseph T. Fry is
unimportant and would not change the character of the funds
or the ownership thereof."' 8 In short, since the defendant
outlived the wife, she was entitled to the whole fund, despite
the premature withdrawal and appropriation of it. The
court did not pass upon the effect of the transaction touch-
ing the will, the bank accounts, etc., saying it was not needed
because the defendant claimed a set-off only in the event
it should be determined that she was under liability to the
plaintiff, and since it had been determined there was no
liability consideration of the issue was unnecessary.
The plaintiff filed exceptions to, and appealed from, the
decree, charging error in failing to hold that the plaintiff
was entitled to the whole of the savings and loan deposit,
in not holding that the defendant was only a fiduciary or
agent as regards the deposit, in failing to hold that there
had been a conversion, and in refusing to confirm the ref-
eree's report as to the liability of the defendant. There was
no exception with respect to the court's refusal to consider
the various aspects of the bank accounts, the validity of the
will, its construction, the administration, and the right of
set-off.19
As has been seen, the Supreme Court accepted as correct
propositions of law the conclusions of the referee as to
the nature and consequences of the savings and loan deposit.
The case raises perhaps more serious implications than may
18. The judge's decree is not reported; it is found in the Record ff.
393-428.
19. This presents an odd feature of the case. Ordinarily the failure to
appeal would make a decided issue the law of the case. Of course the
reason given by the trial judge for not deciding the numerous issues raised
concerning bank accounts, the will, etc., was that the decision hinged upon
the outcome of the main issue-the disposition of the savings and loan ac-
count-which was wholly in favor of the defendant. Obviously the defend-
ant would not, and did not, except to this. In the defendant's brief, how-
ever, there was argument on the point. In the reply brief the plaintiff
declined to argue the issue, calling attention to the fact that no appeal had
been made on that score. Hence the paradox that the Supreme Court
adopts as its opinion a referee's report containing findings not adjudicated
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at first appear. The chief point of difference between the
referee and the trial judge was that while both characterized
the ownership or interest of the three (and later the two)
parties as a "joint tenancy with the right of survivorship,"
the referee concluded that even though the defendant survived
she had no right to appropriate the fund and upon its appro-
priation became liable to the wife to the extent of a half; the
trial judge, while seeming to regard the withdrawal as an
impropriety, regarded the wife's right-other than equal
enjoyment-as contingent upon her survival, which did not
occur. In this view, if the defendant had died first, the wife
would have been entitled to the whole deposit either in its
original or substitute form; and it is a fair guess that if
that event had occurred the claim would have been made by
her for it, and, without unfairness, equally resisted by the
defendant's representatives.
The referee, the Supreme Court (by adoption of his re-
port), and the trial judge accepted the relationship which
had been created by the deposit agreement with the savings
and loan association as a joint tenancy, with right of survivor-
ship, the identical status described in the agreement. Ap-
parently there was acceptance here of the classic common
law joint tenancy including survivorship. In this acceptance
there was perhaps the unwitting resolution of an uncon-
sidered-and, for this State, novel-problem: the effect of
the ancient statute2 0 affecting joint tenancies: "When any
person shall be, at the time of his death, seized or possessed
of any estate in joint tenancy the same shall be adjudged to
be severed by the death of the joint tenant and the same shall
be distributable as if the same were a tenacy in common."
The statute does not abolish joint tenancies, nor does it, as
in many states having statutes affecting such tenancies,
create a presumption against those tenancies;21 it abolishes
only the incident of survivorship.22 The critical question is
20. CODE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-55 (1952).
21. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 6.3 (Casner ed. 1952); 46
A.L.R. (2) 523 (1927).
22. McMeekin v. Brummett, 2 Hill Eq. 638 (1837); Varn v. Varn, 32
S. C. 77, 10 S. E. 829 (1890); Telfair v. Howe, 3 Rich. Eq. 235 (1851);
Green v. Cannady, 77 S. C. 193, 51 S. E. 92 (1907); Davis v. Davis, 223
S. C. 182, 75 S. E. 2d 46 (1953). The existence of joint tenancies is im-
plicit in two statutes dealing with partition, both making reference spe-
cifically to partition of joint tenancies. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
§§ 10-2201, 10-2205 (1952). The statute does not apply to interests which
have not vested. Herbemont v. Thomas, Cheves Eq. 21 (1839); Ball v.
Deas, 2 Strob. Eq. 24 (1848), in both of which the share of a joint legatee
[Vol. 14
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whether in the light of the statutory elimination of survivor-
ship, a survivorship can by express words be attached to a
joint tenancy, which, after all, can be created. There are
three possible answers to the question: (1) the joint tenancy
is effective, but the survivorship not; or (2) the joint tenancy
is not effective, but the survivorship is; or (3) both are
effective, in which event the survivorship is not an incident,
but a principal.
An approach of sorts was made to the issue in the case
of Davis v. Davis.23 There the Court dealt with a deed to
A and B, husband and wife, "as tenants by entirety and the
survivor of them." It was held that the tenancy by the en-
tirety did not exist in South Carolina, but effect would be
given to the intended survivorship by treating the parties
as tenants for life with contingent remainder to the survivor,
or perhaps as tenants in common in fee simple subject to
cross executory limitations between them. The Court would
not substitute a joint tenancy, because, it said, none was
intended and survivorship is not the sole characteristic of a
joint tenancy.24 The Court observed:
There is nothing vicious about the right of survivorship.
Indeed, it was recognized by our General Assembly in
the enactment of the statute relating to bank deposits.
Section 7851 of the 1942 Code [§ 8-171, 1952 Code].2 5
or devisee dying before the testator passed to the survivor or survivors;
Free v. Sandifer, 131 S. C. 232, 126 S. E. 521 (1925). Nor does it apply
to the joint estates of trustees. Ex Parte Knust, 4 Bail. Eq. 489 (1831) ;
Dick v. Harby, 48 S. C. 516,26 S. E. 900 (1896); Andrews v. U. S. F. & G.
Co., 154 S. C. 456, 153 S. E. 745 (1929). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 103 (1959).
23. Supra, note 22.
24. The position of the Chief Justice, in dissent, in which one other
Justice concurred, was that as the tenancy by the entirety did not exist,
the transfer was to the husband and wife as joint tenants (since, the dis-
senting justices said, although estates by the entirety were non-existent
they were a species of or akin to a joint tenancy) ; and that since a joint
tenancy is, by the statute, severed and becomes a tenancy in common by
death, there was no right of survivorship. It is to be noted that the Chief
Justice refused to give sanction to the express provision for survivorship.
The majority opinion took sharp issue with the Chief Justice's view that
a joint tenancy had been created, holding that there had not been; and of
course the question arises whether if such a tenancy had been provided for
in terms, the majority of the court would have nullified the survivorship
as the dissent had done.
25. Although the right of survivorship is recognized in the statute men-
tioned, the statute, by its terms, is designed for the protection of the bank.
The other statute (§ 8-602) dealing with building and savings and loan
associations contains substantially the same provisions and originally was
an amendment to, and part of, the statute relating to banks. CODE OF
1962]
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No rule of public policy or rule of law is violated by
creating an estate in two or more persons with the right
of survivorship. Section 8911 of the Code [§ 19-55, 1952
Code] only abolished survivorship an an incident of the
common law estate of joint tenancy, and was never in-
tended to prevent the creation of the right of survivor-
ship when expressly provided for in a will or deed.
It is not clear whether there is a definitive indication in
the case that a transfer "to A and B as joint tenants, and
the survivor of them," or "to A and B as joint tenants, with
right of survivorship" would bring into being both the joint
estate and the survivorship, or whether it would create only
joint life estates with remainder contingent on survivorship
or a tenancy in common subject to an executory limitation
in favor of the survivor. In the latter instances, of course,
the survivorship would be indestructible. Assuming, how-
ever, that the Davis case sanctions by implication the joint
tenancy and the survivorship by the use of the quoted terms,
it cannot be deduced with certainty that the same result
would follow if the terms were "to A and B and the survivor
of them" or "to A and B with right of survivorship," nor
would there be certainty in a deduction to the contrary. Little
as it may be realized, and despite judicial attitude unfavorable
as a matter of interpretation to joint tenancies, there can be
no escape from the inevitability of a joint tenancy where
LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 8-171, 8-602 (1952). In Hawkins v. Thack-
ston, supra, the decision favoring the survivor was based to a large extent
on the premise that the statute and the nature of the deposit raised a pre-
sumption that the parties intended that the deposit should be paid to the
survivor as owner. The history of the legislation throws some doubt on
this view. In 1926 the General Assembly enacted legislation providing
that if a deposit was made in the names of two persons, payable to either,
or to either or the survivor, the persons named were entitled thereto as
joint tenants, and the bank on payment to either or the survivor would be
discharged. 34 Stat. 1939. This was probably a response to the situation
produced by the cases of Sawyer v. Mabus, supra, and Smith v. Planters
Bank, supra, in the first of which the survivor was held not entitled, and
in the second of which the bank was held liable for paying over to the
survivor. In 1930, the 1926 act was repealed by an act which retained
the provisions as to the joint tenancy and the acquittance of the bank but
limited the amount to $500. It became § 7870 of the 1932 Code. [For its
construction as to responsibility of the bank in paying, as affected by the
form of the deposit, see Motley v. Forester, 165 S. C. 346, 163 S. E. 828
(1932). The construction there should still hold good. See, also, Johnson
v. Bank, 213 S. C. 458, 50 S. E. 2d 177 (1948).] In 1935 the present
act was passed, omitting mention of a joint ownership. 39 Stat. 236.
It contained no express repeal of § 7870. By deleting the reference to the
nature of the ownership of the payees, it is reasonably clear that, while
there is mention of payment to a survivor, the legislature avoided all
characterization of the interest created as between the parties.
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a transfer is simply-and without more--"to A and B. ' 25 a
If that is so, it would seem a distortion of logic to say that
"to A and B" would create a joint tenancy, but that to add
words of survivorship-the "grand incident" of the joint
tenancy-would destroy it, substituting for it joint life es-
tates or tenancies in common.26 The Davis case cannot be
utterly controlling for purposes of a conclusion, since there
the intent was to create a tenancy by the entirety, not a
joint tenancy; the former failing, there was no replacement
by the latter, nor simply a deletion of "by the entirety" to
make the words read only "to A and B and the survivor of
them." It is not surprising that the belief may arise, from
the statute itself,2 7 and from the language and result in the
Davis case, that an attempt specifically to attach a survivor-
ship to a clearly expressed joint tenancy would fail of the
intended purpose, either in rejecting the tenancy or in reject-
the survivorship.
2s
As has been indicated, the whole treatment by the referee
(the Supreme Court as well) and the lower court was to
recognize the co-existence of the joint tenancy and the sur-
vivorship, and thereby, by indirection, to render the statute
inapplicable where survivorship is provided for. In this posi-
tion there is ample concurrence in the authorities elsewhere,2 9
25a. But see Newberry v. Walker, 162 S. C. 478, 161 S. E. 100 (1931),
in which, however, the matter was not in issue.
26. For a discussion of the problem, see the opinion in Davis v. Davis,
supra, and annotation in 69 A.L.R. (2) 1058 (1960), which points out how
the issue arises as a result of the statutes affecting joint tenancies and
survivorship. See also, 1 A.L.R. (2) 247 (1949).
27. Supra, note 20.
28. See Jacobs, Estates of Co-Tenancies in South Carolina, 11 S.C.L.Q.
520, 527-529 (1959), which apparently takes the position, from Davis v.
Davis, that the survivorship as there described-cross remainder or ex-
ecutory limitation-may exist but not the joint tenancy. On the other
hand, see an opinion of the Attorney General, OPs. ATT'Y. GEN. 145 (1953-
54):
In answer to the question .. . concerning the law on survivorship
rights, based on the decisions of the South Carolina Supreme Court
and various statutes enacted by the Legislature, it would seem to
me that survivorship rights cannot be created in South Carolina.
The statute (§ 19-55, 1952 CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA)
specifically provides that in the case of joint tenancy on the death
of one of the joint tenants, his property passes as if owned by him
as tenant in common. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of
Green v. Cannady, indicates that tenancy by the entirety would no
longer exist in South Carolina. In view of the statute and the de-
cision of the Supreme Court, it is my opinion, therefore, that sur-
vivorship rights cannot be created.
This was, of course, before Davis v. Davis.
29. 48 C.J.S., Joint Tenancy § 2 (1947).
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particularly as related to joint bank accounts.30 The broader
implication, of course, is that despite the statute a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship may be created in real
and personal property generally; and, if this is true, to take
a simple example, a conveyance of land to "A and B as joint
tenants, with right of survivorship" would operate precisely
as intended. The right of survivorship-the jus accresendi-
would be preserved, but it would not be indestructible and
could be defeated by an alienation by one of the joint tenants
or by one of the other means producing a severance.
It was assumed at all levels of the case that a joint tenancy
may be created as to a bank deposit or savings and loan
account, and the authorities on the whole are in accord that
not only personal property generally but bank deposits in
particular may be the subject of joint tenancy.8 1 The con-
clusion having been reached in the present case that a joint
tenancy was intended, there is not much point in speculating
whether the parties--the depositor particularly-reUy de-
sired it. It may be difficult to believe that the depositor in-
tended to permit the other two parties (while he was alive)
to terminate the tenancy by transfer or by compelling a
partition, or to deny to himself the right to withdraw and
appropriate for his sole use the whole of the fund. It is not
an unreasonable conjecture that he did not wish his wife and
daughter to have more than the joint ownership during their
lives, with the survivor taking the whole.
82
30. 48 CJ.S., Joint Tenancy § 2 (1947); 7 Am. Jur. Banks § 425
(1937); 85 A.L.R. 282 (1933).
31. 14 AM. JuR. Cotenancy § 10 (1938); 48 C.T.S. Joint Tenancy § 3
(1955); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.4 (Casner ed. 1952). The ex-
istence of joint tenancies in personal property is clearly recognized in the
statute giving the court of common pleas jurisdiction to partition joint
tenancies in real and personal property. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CARO-
LiNA § 10-2205 (1952). The statement has been made that joint tenancy
of a bank account can be established only on the basis of gift or trust-
with the gift or trust a condition precedent. 48 A. L. R. 189, 203 (1927) ; 66
A. L. IL 881, 891 (1930) ; 7 AM. JuR. Banks & 435 (1937). If this is true,
it might be concluded that since, under Hawkins v. Thackston and the re-
viewed case, the right of the donee is based on contract, and not upon gift
or trust, a joint tenancy could not, in South Carolina, be invented in a
bank account. This, of course, is arguing in a vacuum, since in the present
case there has been acceptance of both the contract theory and the joint
tenancy flowing from its terms.
32. Presumptively, under Hawkins v. Thackston, a deposit by A payable
to A or B indicates an intent that the survivor shall take beneficially.
But a deposit by A payable to A or B or C presents the question whether
A's presumed intent is that on his death first B and C shall take equally
as tenants in common without survivorship, or whether the survivorship
feature is to continue as between them. The present ease does not an-
240 [Vol. 14
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The refere's report, which has been quoted earlier, shows
adherence to the technical aspeets of joint tenancy-up to a
point. The point -is the critical one in which he and the
trial judge came into disagreement. The referee treated the
appropriation by the defendant, her redeposit in another
state, and her refusal of the wife's demand, as a severance
and termination of the tenancy; the trial judge did not. Both
agreed that withdrawal and appropriation into another, and
individual, account did not destroy the joint character of*
the estate. The referee's holding is that "As a joint tenant.
having a substantial interest in this account, Janie Austin
Fry could have terminated the account by a withdrawal of
one-half thereof, or by a voluntary partition or agreement
with her co-owner." That the tenancy could be terminated
by voluntary partition seems clear; that a transfer by her of
her interest would also work a severance seems likewise
clear; and it is also reasonably plain that a compulsory par-
tition could have been demanded and, if decreed, would have
produced a termination.8 3 The authority cited by the ref-
eree34 to support the statement just quoted makes no mention
of withdrawal by the co-owner of a bank account, but it would
seem on principle that if a transfer of the interest could
accomplish a severance, a withdrawal would serve the same
purpose.85
In view of the concurrence of the referee and the trial
judge that the redeposit in the daughter's name did not des-
swer the question since the agreement was expressed in favor of "sur-
vivors or survivor." And, even if, in the three-party case, there might not
be a presumption of survivorship as between the two surviving donees, the
continuation of the account in their names conceivably might raise it.
33. CoDE oF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-2201 (1952), making par-
tition compellable between joint tenants, and tenants in common, refers
to lands only, but even without the statute compulsory partition of per-
sonal property may be had between co-tenants, as indeed may real prop-
erty. See TnFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 307 (abridged ed. 1940); Holley v.
Glover, 36 S. C. 404, 15 S. E. 605 (1892). Another Code section, CODE Op
LAws OF SoUT CAROLINA § 10-2205 (1952), gives the court of common
pleas jurisdiction to make partition "in all cases of real and personal es-
tates held in joint tenancy or in common."
34. 14 AM. Jun. 86.
35. In New York, which recognizes joint tenancies in bank accounts, a
withdrawal by a joint tenant of his moiety produces a severance, and if
less than his share a severance to that extent. In re Suter's Estate, 258
N. Y. 104, 179 N. E. 310 (1932). But if the whole be withdrawn by one
and redeposited in his name without the consent of the other the joint
tenancy is not disturbed. Accordingly, if the party withdrawing dies be-
fore the other, the latter is entitled to the whole account. See the New
York cases collected in 161 A.L.R., beginning at page 78, and also be-
ginning at page 86.
4119621
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troy the joint tenancy, the question then narrows down to
whether the subsequent conduct of the parties produced a
severance. To justify the conclusion of severance, the referee
places heavy reliance upon the text in 161 A. L. R., pp. 74-75,
and in 7 American Jurisprudence (Banks), 1959 Supplement,
p. 39. It is highly arguable that the cited material does not,
.as a whole, support the conclusion reached.36  It is difficult,
S6. See 7 AM. JuR., Banks, § 426 (Supp. 1961):
Under the doctrine prevailing in most jurisdictions where the point
has been considered the act of a joint tenant or tenant by entirety
in withdrawing all the money from the account does not destroy the
joint estate, or the estate by the entireties, as the case may be. Ac-
cordingly, where by means of creation of a joint bank account a gift
of a joint account is made, it is held, in some cases, that the subse-
quent act of the donee in withdrawing all of the money leaves the
joint estate intact Passing notice may be taken of the fact that
under the doctrine that a total withdrawal made by the donee of a
joint bank account does not destroy the joint estate, it may happen-
that the donee as survivor will succeed to the whole fund notwith-
standing he unlawfully withdrew the whole of it during the donor's
lifetime (italics supplied).
The identical language appears in 161 A.L.R. at pages 84 and 85.
Language of similar import is to be found in 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy §
4 (1955):
A joint tenancy of a bank account may be terminated by the con-
sent or agreement of the parties. It has been held that the joint
tenant of a bank account may terminate the joint tenancy by a
transfer or conveyance of his interest, and by a withdrawal of his
share terminate the joint tenancy as to that sum, but a withdrawal
of the entire account without the other's consent does not effect ter-
mination of the joint tenancy but only a change in the form of the
property, although it has been held that a withdrawal of the entire
amount of the account terminates the joint tenancy and makes the
fund the personal property of the party withdrawing it.
it has earlier been commented that if the defendant had died first, the
wife would probably have claimed-and in all likelihood successfully-the
whole of the fund. Most of the cases have been cases of that kind-the
withdrawing party dying first, and the other becoming entitled to the
entire fund.
In New Jersey the withdrawal alone-and without more-by one
joint tenant of the entire fund destroys the joint tenancy and entitles
each party to one-half. In the present case it is conceded that the mere
Withdrawal does not accomplish that result, and the New Jersey decisions
on that account cannot be persuasive authority for the present case. For
the New Jersey decisions, see 161 A. L. R. 71, 80 (1946).
The annotation in 161 A.L.R. is appended to the case of -State v.
Gralewski,_ Ore.-, 159 P. 2d 211, 166 A.L.R. 66 (1945), which de-
nies destruction of the joint tenancy by withdrawal of the entire fund by
one of the parties. This case was relied upon by the trial judge in the
present case. It is true that there appears in the annotation in 161 A.L.R.,
at page 75 and also in the text in 7 Am. JUR. Banks § 426 (Supp. 1959),
as noted by the referee, that "where it has been established that both
parties have substantial interest in a joint account, it follows that neither
can appropriate the whole interest without liability to the other." But
the statement has to be qualified by determination of whether the "joint
account" was a tenancy in common, whether it created only a right con-
tingent upon survivorship, or a true joint tenancy. If the last, then the
extent of contributions made by the parties would be of no consequence.
16
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on principle, to justify the conclusion that the removal and
redeposit of the fund in another state worked a severance.
It might have produced inconvenience but it did not shut
off the right to sue in the other state. A redeposit in South
Carolina in the defendant's name would be equally placing
'the money "outside of the control and possession of Janie
Austin Fry and beyond her reach", as the referee char-
acterized the North Carolina deposit. Or, to put it another
way, it was no more out of her control and reach in North
Carolina than if the redeposit had been made in South Caro-
lina. And it is difficult to equate a demand for a share and
its refusal with a partition. There was the privilege to both
parties of voluntary partition, and the right in each to compel
partition, but these are not the same as actual partition.
Partition produces severance because it produces the destruc-
tion of one of the unities of a joint tenancy-possession. A
demand for partition and a refusal should no more serve to
destroy a joint tenancy of a bank account than a similar de-
mand and refusal in the case of land. Demand for partition
and refusal are not partition.37 Calling the actions of the
defendant a "conversion," if there has been no severance
"Liability" by the withdrawing party to the other party could hardly, in
the case of a true joint tenancy, create an immediate affirmative duty to
pay over one-half the fund. Of course, there could be demand, followed
by a suit, for a division, but that could occur even where there had been
no total withdrawal.
37. See 64 A.L.R. (2) 918 (1929), entitled "What acts by one or more
joint tenants will sever or terminate the tenancy." It is there indicated that
even where a suit for partition has been commenced, there is no severance
if there has been no decree of partition. Reference in the annotation to
"demand for division" as producing a severance seems limited, if accepted
at all, to beneficial joint interests under a trust.
In. Harrington v. Emmerman, 186 F. 2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1950) where an
account was carried in two names, the committee of the depositor made
demand on the other party for possession of the pass book, but the demand
was refused. The committee claimed the whole of the account and sued.
The depositor thereafter died and her executors, as plaintiffs in substitu-
tion of the committee, sought to recover the account. The defendant
claimed she was entitled to the fund as survivor. The court concluded
that the true nature of the account could be inquired into; that if there
was intent to create only survivorship, with a right in the depositor to
withdraw the whole fund, demand destroyed the survivorship; if there was
a tenancy in common, the demand entitled the defendant to one-half. The
defendant's contention that a joint tenancy existed was, under the facts,
denied; she was evidently taking the position that with a joint tenancy
a demand would not produce a severance. The court seems to accept the
legal principle asserted. "Nor can she justify her conduct by asserting
that the terms of the deposit agreement, including its use of the words
'joint owners' created a technical joint tenancy which could not be severed
by the mere request of one tenant that the estate be divided. The rela-
tion created by the writing was a tenancy in common." 186 F. 2d 757,
760, n. 8.
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in the legal sense; can hardly be accepted as justification for
reaching a result that only a severance would entail. 83
It is assumed throughout the discussion of the case under
review that the same rules and principles are applicable to
building and loan or savings and loan associations accounts
as are applicable to bank accounts. The authorities generally
so treat them; so does Hawkins v. Thackston. The theoretical
distinction between a bank depositor as a creditor and a
building and loan depositor as a shareholder is seemingly
of no consequence; and in any event the promise to pay or
redeem to the depositor, member or shareholder creates a
debtor-creditor relationship too close to the relationship af-
forded by a bank deposit to warrant any substantial dif-
ference in application to joint accounts whether in bank or
association.
Partition--Heir's Claim Against Estate
The question of whether, in an action for partition of land,
where the estate has not been settled, an heir may by way of
counterclaim or cross-action set up a claim against the estate
is presented in Watson v. Watson.39 The case also involves
the question of the statutory restriction upon the time within
which an action upon a claim may not be brought. The plain-
tiffs were t-.o of the heirs of their mother, one of them
38. Whether a bank or savings and loan account can be the subject of"conversion" is open to question. See 44 A.L.R. (2) 927 (1926), entitled
"Nature of property or rights other than tangible chattels which may be
subject to conversion." Money may be the subject of conversion, provided
it is specific. Abrahams v. R. R. Co., 1 S. C. 441 (1869). But whether the
defendant's conduct be denominated "conversion" or "fraud," the cause of
action arising from it as a tort would not survive the death of the wife
and an action would not lie by her administrator. Chaplin v. Barrett, 12
Rich. Law 284 (1859); but recovery could be had on a quasi-contractual
or restitutional basis. Chaplin v. Barrett, supra; Caldwell v. Ford, 3 Hill
Law 248 (1827); Adams v. Haselden, 112 S. C. 32, 99 S. E. 762 (1919).
The Survival Act, CoDE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-209 (1952) per-
mits the survival of tort actions only where there has been actual injury
to personal property. Bemis v. Waters, 170 S. C. 432, 170 S. E. 475
(1933). If there was a right in the wife to follow the fund into its new
form, the redeposit, the constructive trust that would thus arise would
not be destroyed by her death. As to the right to follow, see 77 A. L. R.
799 (1932); as to the constructive trust, see Harrington v. Emmerman,
supra. Of course, if the fund could not be traced or identified, the trust
aspect would disappear. Want v. Best, 233 S. C. 460, 105 S. E. 2d 678
(1958).
39. 237 S. C. 174, 117 S. E. 2d 145 (1960). The parties to this action
were defendants in another partition action involving lands owned by
their intestate and the plaintiff. The case, which makes mention of the
present case, is discussed in this survey under Property. Mallow v. Wat-
son, 237 S. C. 226, 116 S. E. 2d 689 (1960).
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suing individually and as administrator; the defendants were
the other heirs, one being sued individually and as co-adminis-
trator. The complaint, which was served less than three
months from the death of the intestate, asked for partition
in kind.40 All but one of the defendants asked for partition
in kind of a portion of the land and for sale of the balance.
The remaining defendant also asked for partition in kind
of part and sale of the other land (it does not appear whether
this defendant and the others were asking for partition in
kind and by sale of identical parcels).41 In her answer this
last defendant set up "For a Second Defense and By Way of
Counterclaim and Cross Complaint" a claim for services
rendered the decedent, and alleged that she had previously
filed with the administrators a claim for the amount alleged
to be due. Judgment was asked against the administrators
and that the judgment "be declared a lien upon the premises
described in the complaint." A copy of the claim alleged to
have been furnished the administrators was attached to the.
answer. It was dated two days before the date of answer.
The answer, with its counterclaim or cross-claim, was served
about three months after the decedent's death.
The plaintiffs demurred to the counterclaim on the grounds
(1) that no claim existed in favor of the defendant against
the plaintiffs between whom a several judgment might be
40. The complaint is not set out in full in the opinion or in the record.
Hence, it does not appear what the allegations were with respect to the
joinder of one of the plaintiffs as administrator and one of the defend-
ants in a similar capacity. Presumably it was in view of circuit court
rule 54:
No partition of real estate of a deceased person shall be had unless
the legal representative or representatives of such deceased person
be made parties to the action and it be made to appear to the Court
that the debts of such deceased person are fully paid, or that the
personal estate in the hands of the personal representative be suffi-
cient for the payment of the debts of such deceased person, or un-
less due provision is made for the payment of the debts.
Absent the complaint it cannot be learned from the record whether the
personal estate was sufficient for debts. It is apparent, however, that
debts had not been fully paid.
41. The defendant did not resist the action as being premature under
the twelve-months rule (now probably reduced to sLx) affecting partition
actions. The question was raised by the parties to the present action in
opposition to the action in Mallow v. Watson, supra. It was decided ad-
versely to them, the Court noting incidentally that they were hardly in
a position to raise the issue of prematurity in the light of their having
brought this action within such a short time. For a discussion of the rule
see Mallow v. Watson as noted under Property. Even if the defendant
had objected to the hastiness of the action, the result would have been
the same as in the Mallow case because the time consumed by the appeal
was enough to render the question moot.
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had; (2) that the counterclaim did not arise out of the con-
tract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the founda-
tion of plaintiff's claim or connected with the subject of the
action; (3) that to permit the counterclaim would be.to per-
mit the improper uniting of several causes of action; (4)
that the counterclaim did not state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a cause of action in that (a) action within six months
from a decedent's death to recover a debt of an estate is
forbidden by § 19-554 of the 1952 Code; (b) there was no
allegation of filing and proving the claim as required by §§
19-473 and 19-474 of the 1952 Code; (c) the five months
allowed for the ascertainment of claims by the administrator
under § 19-473 of the 1952 Code had not expired; (5) that
the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject of the count-
erclaim for the same reasons set out in 4 (a), (b), (c) ; (6)
that there was a defect of parties in that the subject of the
counterclaim was maintainable only against the personal
representatives and not against the heirs. A motion was
also made to strike the counterclaim on the same grounds.
The trial judge overruled the demurrer and denied the
motion to strike, stating, "This is a proper case to apply the
equitable principle that when a court of equity has juris-
diction over a cause for any purpose, it may retain the cause
for all purposes and proceed to a final determination of all
the matters at issue."42
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed. After setting out
the provisions of the Code relating to counterclaims, 43 the
Court declared, "The counterclaim under consideration does
not fall within the provisions of the foregoing sections of the
Code and may not, therefore, be filed by one of the heirs for
services rendered the decedent in a partition action."
It is to be noted that the Court rests its conclusion on only
the first and second (and possibly the sixth) grounds of
42. The trial judge's order is not set out in the opinion or otherwise in
the report of the case. The quoted language is found in the REcoRD, f.59-60.
43. CODE OF LAWS OF SOuTH CAROLINA § 10-703 (1952):
The counterclaim mentioned in § 10-652 must be one existing in
favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a several
judgment might be had in the action and arising out of one of the
following causes of action: (1) A cause of action arising out of
the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim or connected with the subject
of the action; or (2) In an action arising on contract, any other
cause of action arising also on contract and existing at the com-
mencement of the action.
[Vol. 14
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demurrer. It does not touch upon the other grounds going
largely to substance except to dismiss the assertion (made in
the demurrer and motion to strike) that the action on the
counterclaim could not be brought within six months from
the intestate's death, giving as the reason that the six months
had elapsed and the question had become moot.
44
A fair argument may be made that the provisions of the
counterclaim statute, on which the Court based its action,
are not a proper reason, or are too narrow a ground, to
justify the sustaining of the demurrer. The defendant de-
nominated her pleading a counterclaim but she also termed
it a cross-complaint; and while this may appear to be a quib-
ble with words, it has all the appearance of the familiar
cross-bill in equity which may put into issue and bring into
the suit the rights and equities of the parties relating to the
subject matter.45 It may be true that a several judgment
might not be had against all the parties, but a decree affect-
ing the rights of all the parties as precipitated by the cross-
complaint could be had. Moreover, a judgment so obtained
would not be a judgment against the administrator or ad-
ministrators personally but one affecting the land in suit-
and in that sense also touching, the heirs, although they, too,
are not personally liable. It does not require extensive re-
ference to authority for the proposition that in order to pre-
vent multiplicity of actions, a court of equity will "reach
44. The prohibition against suit within six months is found in CODE oF
LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-554 (1952), as amended by Act No. 767 of
1956. The amendment, among other things, changed the prohibited period
from twelve months to six months. Originally the period was nine months.
The amendment, among other things, changed the prohibited period from
twelve months to six months. Originally the period was nine months.
5 Stat. 106 (1789). As to the purpose of the act, see 9 S. C. L. Q. 169.
The act has been before the Court many times but there seem to be -no
cases in which the action brought within the restricted period was rep-
resented by a cross-action, as distinguished from an original one. The
proposition that if the time has run during the appeal the question becomes
moot and the action can proceed was previously approved in Striedand
v. Chaplin, 199 S. C. 203, 18 S. E. 2d 736 (1942), the result being reached
on the ground that in the event of premature suit in violation of the
statute, the practice is not to dismiss but to stay the proceedings until
the time has elapsed. O'Daniel v. Lehre, 2 Strob. Eq. 83 (1848), in
which it is also said, "There may be cases when the bill may be en-
tertained, even before the time usually limited; as where it is filed to
preserve the estate from imminent danger of loss."
45. See 68 C. J. S. Partition § 95 (a) (1950): "A cross-bill or cross.
complaint is proper whenever it is necessary in order to do complete
justice between the parties and to adjust the equities between them
connected with the property sought to be partitioned in the original
action." See also, 68 C. J. S. Partition § 150 (3) (1950).
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out and draw into its consideration and determination the
entire subject matter and bring before it the parties in-
terested therein .. ."46 Here the claiming heir is already a
party, and her claim, if substantiated, would allow her to
reach the land or its proceeds.47 If the counterclaim statute
is a bar in this case, it would also be a bar-and there has
been no suggestion that it is-to a claimed offset for improve-
ments, or rents, or discharge of taxes or an encumbrance.
Lienors, whether of undivided interests of the heirs, or of
the whole interest through the act of the decedent, have never
been impeded by the statute in the assertion of their cross-
claims against the parties and the property. It may not be nec-
essary to make them parties but, once they are, they may
assert their rights;48 and this would necessarily take the
affirmative form of a cross-action.
Looking to the sixth ground of demurrer (on which the
Court may also have proceeded) it would appear that if the
defendant could have sued the administrators and the heirs
together in order to reach the land for payment of her debt,
it would not be objectionable to sue them, so far as the
counterclaim statute is concerned, by way of cross-complaint.
It is well settled that a judgment against the personal rep-
resentative, sued alone, on a debt of the estate may reach the
land; but that if the heirs or devisees are in actual and ex-
clusive possession, action must be brought against them; 49
but even where an action might be brought against the rep-
resentative only, or where judgment is asked against him
alone, the heirs may be made parties, because of their possible
46. 40 AM. Jun. Partition § 65 (1942).
47. The claim, not reduced to judgment, is not strictly a lien; but it
differs from the claim against a living debtor in that the decedent's land
can be subjected to its payment even though it has reached the hands of
a purchaser, if the alienation has not been bona fide. It has been termed
a "constructive lien," Jones v. Wightman, 2 Hill L. 577, 583 (1835), and
an "equity," Hand v. Kelly, 102 S. C. 151, 156, 86 S. E. 382, 384 (1915).
48. 40 ALT. Jun. Partition § 66 (1942); 126 A. L. R. 414 (1940).
49. Huggins v. Oliver, 21 S. C. 147 (1883); Brock v. Kirkpatrick, 60
S. C. 322, 38 S. E. 779 (1900) ; McNair v. Howle, 123 S. C. 252, 116 S. E.
229 (1922). If the lands have been partitioned among the heirs, their
possession becomes actual and exclusive, so as to preclude recourse to
the land by execution under a judgment against the representative, and
the land can be reached only by a proceeding against the heirs. D'Urphey
v. Nelson, 1 Brev. 476 (1803); Rogers v. Huggins, 6 S. C. 356 (1874);
Huggins v. Oliver supra; Ex Parte Worley, 49 S. C. 41, 26 S. E. 949
(1896); Brock v. Kirkpatrick, supra. In the present case, if partition
took place, a subsequent action against the administrator and the heirs,
and not the administrator alone, would be necessary to reach the land
for the payment of the defendant's claim.
(Vol. 14
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interest and to settle questions concerning possession.r0 But
aside from these considerations there is room for conclusion
that the language in subsection (1) of the statute is broad
enough to embrace the cross-action: "A cause of action
arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the
complaint as the formation of the plaintiff's claim or con-
nected with the subject of the action!" (italics supplied). The
defendant's attempt to reach the land would seem to be con-
nected with the subject of the action. This is not objection-
able as would be the assertion by the defendant of a claim
against either of the plaintiffs arising out of a personal ob-
ligation or liability unsecured by or unrelated to the descended
land. Indeed, it may be questioned whether in any event the
counterclaim statute has any application to an equitable action
of this character. The defendant was not urging her claim
solely against the plaintiff administrator but against her
co-defendant administrator as well; and her claim against
the estate affected the parties on each side. Her cross-demand
was directed not alone to the plaintiffs but to her co-defend-
ants. If the plaintiff administrator had been a defendant,
along with his co-administrator, the objection to a counter-
claim could not well be advanced; and it would seem of no
consequence that he was a plaintiff instead.
But, if it be conceded for argument's sake, that the counter-
claim statute does not stand in the way of the cross-claim,
a question of substance would remain: whether in an action
for partition an heir may insist upon the adjudication of his
claim against the estate. The answer generally is that he
may not,51 although if the action were one to marshall assets,
with partition as an incident, he could do so.5 2 There would
50. Tolbert v. Roark, 126 S. C. 207, 119 S. E. 571 (1923). Similarly,
if the heirs alone are sued they may compel joinder of the representative.
McNair v. Howle, supra.
51. 68 C. J. S. Partition § 143 (b) (1950):
Ordinarily a judgment in partition should not determine and settle
claims against the estate that is being partitioned, when such claims
are properly cognizable in a court of probate, and a court of equity
will not, in a partition suit, determine claims against the estate
to be partitioned as to which there is an adequate remedy at law.
Nevertheless, it has been held that the court, on partition, may
ascertain and provide . . . that provision may be made for the
satisfaction of adjudicated claims, or claims enforceable as proper
charges or liens against the land.
52. See Galphin v. Wells, 236 S. C. 606, 115 S. E. 2d 288 (1960), dealt
with earlier in this survey, but not on this point; Erwin v. Williams,
199 S. C. 38, 18 S. E. 2d 598 (1942). In Sherwood v. McLaurin, 96 S. C.
348, 80 S. E. 609 (1913), executors brought an action against legatees
19621
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seem to be some point in objection to the assertion of a claim
of an heir in a partition action,- not only because of its inter-
ference with and delay of that action, but because of its tak-
ing the consideration of the claim out of the normal channels
of administration and throwing the- personal representative
into a new arena of action. Since the action is not to marshall
assets, in which the validity of claims is passed upon by the
master or referee, the question may arise whether the making
of a demand for judgment in this action is nothing more than
a pure money demand triable by a jury and the subject of
an independent action.5 3 Even if the defendant were to, ob-
tain a judgment for her debt, it might be deprived of its
efficacy if assets were not sufficient to pay all debts of the
estate. Though reduced to judgment, the priority of a claim
is determined by its status at the time of the decedent's
death;54 and a contract claim at the time of death, though
represented by a judgment obtained upon it afterwards, ranks
only as a contract obligation in the order of priority of
payment. Such a debt is prorated with other contract ob-
ligations and is last in the order.55 The dilemma of the per-
sonal 'representative, who is charged with paying debts ac-
cording to their statutory order, is plain enough; and in
a partition suit in which he is a party only because of a rule
of court and not to further administration, for him to be con-
fronted with an unliquidated claim, whose validity and prior-
ity he would have to determine, heightens his dilemma and
makes his task more difficult. It may be a central procedural
issue, therefore, whether an action on a claim may properly be
and devisees to construe the will, pay debts, sell land for the purpose, and
effect a division of the balance. One of the devisees set up a debt owed
her by the testator. It was held that she could do so. It is to be noted
that this was primarily an action to marshall assets, and that the devisee
having been made a party, in the language of the Court, "it was not only
her right but 'her duty to declare her whole mind.' " A similar result
was reached in Gaston v. Gaston, 80 S. C. 157, 61 S. E. 393 (1908) which
was an action in the probate court to sell land in aid of assets and for divi-
sion in which an heir was allowed to set up a claim for services furnished
to another heir, since deceased. Since actions to marshall assets are
essentially proceedings looking to the payment of debts, and since divi-
sion of surplus follows as a matter of course, there can hardly be a
question that the claim of an heir is as provable as that of any other
person. The fact that the personal representative is joined as required,
as a party plaintiff or defendant, in a partition does not, of course, turn
the action into one for marshalling of assets. See Smith v. Pearson, 210
S. C. 524, 43 S. E. 2d 479 (1947).
53. Hand v. Kelley, supra; McNair v. Howle, supra.
54. Wilson v. McConnell, 9 Rich. Eq. 500 (1857); Maxwell v. Greene,
171 S. C. 253, 172 S. E. 246 (1933); 121 A. L. R. 656 (1939).
55. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-476 (1952).
[Vol 14
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brought as was attempted to be done in this case. On the
other hand, while the settlement of the estate is not a con-
dition precedent to partition,56 the twelve-months rule" and
circuit court rule 5455 evidence the concern of the courts for
the protection of creditors; and it might be argued from this
that when one of the parties asserts a claim it ought to be
heard and that he ought not, with the change-in possession
brought about by partition, to be compelled to bring another
action.59 This position, for. what it is worth, is not weakened
by the fact (as the demurring parties urged) that filing the
claim with, and disposing of it by, the representative, and
his ascertainment of other possible claims, had to precede the
defendant's cross-action based upon it. It seems to be fairly
well established that the filing of a claim is not a prerequisite
to the bringing .of suit, and that the commencement of an
action is itself considered a sufficient presentation,60 even
though the statute calling for presentation of claims is a
non-claim statute.61
56. 68 C. J. S. Partition § 46 (1950); 40 AM. Jur. Partition § 29
(1942); Atkinson v. Jackson, 24 S. C. 594 (1886).
57. Supra, note 41.
58. Supra, note 40. In several cases applying the rule the Court has
permitted the partition to proceed because, the administrator being a
party, there was a showing of payment of debts, or sufficiency of per-
sonal assets, or provision made for payment in the decree. Atkinson v.
Jackson, supra; Connor v. McCoy, 83 S. C. 165, 65 S. E. 257 (1909);
Green v. Cannady, 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. E. 832 (1907). In the last case a
creditor intervened by petition, and, taking account of his claim, the
Court ordered due provision made for the payment of his debt. The
partition took the form of a sale. If, in the present case, there was not,
for all it appears, a sufficiency of personal assets, and the partition was
to be in kind, it is difficult to perceive how due provision could be made
for payment of debts, particularly when the debts at the time of the suit
had not been ascertained and the defendant's claim, unliquidated, was
the subject of dispute. It will be recalled that in Mallow v. Watson the
Court ordered the partition to proceed. It observed concerning the intes-
tate estate there, which is the same here, ". . . the administrators of the
estate . . . were made parties to this action as required by Rule 54 of
the Circuit Court and it will be assumed that in the partition decree
proper provision will be made to protect the creditors, if any, of decedent's
estate."
59. Supra, note 50.
60. 34 C. J. S. Executors and Administrators § 396 (1942); 21 AM.
Jun. Executors and Administrators § 342 (1939) ; 34 A. L. R. 362 (1925).
61. 21 AM. JUR. Executors and Administrators § 345 (1939). The
matter has not been passed upon in this state, but before the present
statute, CODE OF LAwS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-474 (1952), became a
statute of non-claim in 1943 instances were fairly common of actions
on debts without prior filing of claim. McNair v. Howle, supra; Columbia
Theological Seminary v. Arnette, 168 S. C. 272, 167 S. E. 465 (1932).
The language of the present statute does not require filing as a prerequi-
site to suit, and as a suit may be regarded as equivalent to presentation,
there seems to be no reason to suppose in this state a result contrary to
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Wills-Revocation and Reviva--Jurisdiction
A case involving important questions of revocation and
revival of wills is Madden v. Madden.62 The facts are con-
fusing, almost bizarre. The testator, who had a second wife
and two children by his first marriage, had executed a will
in 1953. He executed a later will, in 1957, which expressly
revoked all former wills. In it he gave his wife, "for her life,
all my property, real, personal, and mixed, to be used for her
benefit and use in whatsoever manner she see fit and, upon
her death, all of the remainder to go to my children, Harmon
Andrew Madden and Ruby M. Sellers, share and share alike."
The will further provided that should one or both of the child-
ren predecease his wife leaving child or children, such child
or children should take the share the parent would have
taken 63 The will, in which the wife was named executrix,
was probated in common form in October, 1958, shortly after
the testator's death.
In June, 1959, the two children brought the present action
in the common pleas court of Greenville County (and there-
after by consent transferred to the county court) against
their stepmother, individually and as executrix, and their
children, some of whom were minors, individually and as
representatives of a class. The complaint stated that the
testator had made the 1953 will, under which, so the allega-
tion ran, the homeplace had been given to the wife, in fee
simple, and the remainder of the estate, real and personal,
had been given to the wife and children, one-half to her and
one-fourth to each of them (the significance of the italicized
the prevailing view. The previous statute (ante 1943) also referred to fil-
ing of claims. The major difference was that under the earlier statute the
claims were not barred by failure to present them within the prescribed
time, and the present statute bars them. This change does not go to the
effect of suit as a form of presentation. Of course as a practical matter
the claim will first be presented, rather than suit brought, since the time
for presentation is five months after the first publication of notice to
creditors, CODE OF LAWS OF S. C. § 19-474 (1952), and, as has been noted,
an action to recover a debt cannot be brought within six months from
the decedent's death. It would appear, however, as has been seen, that
even if the action is prematurely brought in the face of the statute, it is
not nullified, merely delayed, so that it may be said that the prematurity
of the action would not prevent it from operating as a presentation of
the claim. The converse, that filing of a claim is the bringing of an action,
is not true. Floyd Mortuary v. Newman, 222 S. C. 421, 73 S. E. 2d 444
(1953). § 19-474 has recently (1961) been amended. This is discussed
hereafter under Legislation.
62. 237 S. C. 629, 118 S. E. 2d 343 (1961).
63. RECORD, ff. 179-181.
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words will appear later) ; and that he had later made the 1957
will. The complaint further alleged that in September, 1958,
the testator had expressed a desire in the presence of his
wife and children to make a new will under which the wife
was to receive a life interest in the home place, the remainder
therein to his children, and the residue divided one-half to the
wife and one-fourth to each of the children; that the wife
objected to the proposed change but stated that she would
accept the provisions of the 1953 will, as set out in the com-
plaint. It was then alleged that relying on the wife's promise
the testator refrained from revoking his second will, and that
it was the agreement of the parties that the testator's prop-
erty should be divided as under the 1953 will. The further
allegation was that the 1957 will had been probated but that
the wife had refused to honor her promise to hold the prop-
erty under the terms of the 1953 will; that this promise had
been fraudulently made in order to induce the testator not to
change his will; that the wife by her actions had been unjustly
enriched. The prayer was that the wife be declared to be
trustee of the testator's property for the benefit of herself
and the plaintiffs in accord with the provisions of the 1953
will, and that she be compelled to make conveyance to the
plaintiffs accordingly.
In her answer the wife admitted the execution of both the
1953 and 1957 wills; she alleged that the testator had re-
tained both wills because he was undecided as to which one to
use; she admitted the agreement between the testator, herself
and the other parties as to the disposition to be made accord-
ing to the 1953 will, and that she was ready and willing to
carry it out. She then stated that she was willing to have the
1953 will admitted to probate in lieu of the 1957 will already
admitted to probate. Instead of joining in the prayer to
establish a trust (no mention was made of it) she concluded:
"Defendant joins with Plaintiffs in requesting permission
to probate the will of M. E. Madden, deceased, dated in
1953, in lieu of the will heretofore offered for probate."
The defendant turned the other cheek in making no mention
of the allegation of fraud in her promise.
The action, as the Supreme Court saw it, had all the ear-
marks of a friendly suit, but during the trial the parties
seemed to have become better acquainted with the terms of
the 1953 will. Instead of its giving the residue of real and
i 6g]
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personal estate to the wife and children it gave all the per-
sonal estate to the wife and only the residue of the real
estate for division among her and the children. The aver-
ment, therefore, in the complaint was erroneous. Included in
the assets of the estate were real estate mortgages - which
are personal property - forming a considerable fraction of
the value of the estate. The theretofore friendly suit ceased to
be friendly and the plaintiffs, who were now taking a more
appreciative view of the 1957 will,"4 sought to have it sus-
tained, but did not altogether abandon the notion of a con-
structive trust, contending that they were entitled to such
a trust not according to the actual terms of the 1953 will but
according to the terms they had alleged in the complaint.
The lower court reached the conclusion that the testator
prior to the conference in 1958 had not made up his mind
as to which of the two wills would constitute his last will,
and that he did not intend in making the 1957 will to revoke
the earlier one. It thereupon proceeded to utilize in its way
the doctrine of revival of wills recognized by the cases of
Taylor v. Taylor,(5 and Kollock v. Williams,"6 under which
a will revoked by a later will which is thereafter destroyed
or cancelled animo revocandi is deemed revived if it has
been allowed to exist, and declared that the testator having
left the 1953 will intact and having intended to revoke the
second will, the 1953 will was revived. The court declared
that although the testator did not destroy the 1957 will
64. Precisely what estate was created in the parties by the 1957 will,
or what estate they assumed that they had, are unanswered questions.
The wife, objecting to the proposed new will giving her a life estate in
the home place, may have believed, as may have the children, that because
of the power in the 1957 will to use as she saw fit she had a fee. There
is the possibility, of course, that she took a fee, but it is more likely that
at most she took a life estate with power to consume, with contingent
remainder interests in the children and grandchildren. If the 1957 will
gave her the full estate, her promise to hold all the testator's property
under the terms of the 1953 will would be meaningful, but if she had only
a life interest a promise to hold her interest subject to the terms of the
1953 will which made absolute and complete gifts in fee to the takers
would be incongruous to say the least. She could not subject the other
beneficiaries under the 1957 will, particularly the grandchildren born and
to be born, to a trust of property to which she did not have full title. If
the testator's children had ever assumed complete ownership to be in the
wife they certainly abandoned that view in the course of the trial, because
they then fought for the upholding of the 1957 will. If the wife had ever
assumed that she had the fee by reason of the 1957 will, she too changed
her mind, otherwise she would not seek the reinstatement of the 1953
will, which gave her ownership of less than all the property.
65. 2 N. & McC. Law 482 (1820).
66. 131 S. C. 352, 127 S. E. 444 (1924).
[Vol. 14254
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he did so in effect when he announced a desire and
conclusion to use the first ... will, and not the second
... will. As stated in the Taylor case, it is regarded as
a question of intention and may be controlled by other
evidence. The plaintiffs, testator's children, by their
complaint acknowledged that the testator revoked his
second will by expressing, after full discussion, his de-
sire and intent to use the [first] will. 7
The trial judge in conclusion ordered: "For the reasons
above stated this Court is of the opinion that the first will
of the testator... is and constitutes the last will and test-
ament of the said M. E. Madden and that said will should be
probated in lieu of the [1957] will." 68
The Supreme Court reversed. As to the trust sought by
the plaintiffs, the Court declined to review that feature of
the case, as the lower court had not passed upon it.69 The
Supreme Court made short shrift of the lower court's hold-
ing that there was no intent to have the second will operate
initially, and sustained it as both a revoking and a disposi-
tive instrument.70 The Court pointed out that with the animus
67. RECORD, ff. 204.
68. RECORD, ff. 214-215.
69. If, in fact, a promise had been made by the wife, beneficiary under
the second will, to use the property for the purposes set out in the first
will, she could be held as a constructive trustee and compelled to carry
out her promise, even though there was no fraud in the making of it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 55 (1959); 66 A. L. R. 156 (1930);
155 A. L. R. 106 (1945); Towles v. Burton, Rich. Eq. Cases 146 (1832);
Stuckey v. Truette, 124 S. C. 122, 117 S. E. 192 (1922) (concurring
opinion); Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 192 S. C. 497, 7 S. E. 2d 447 (1940);
Wolfe v. Wolfe, 215 S. C. 530, 56 S. E. 2d 343 (1949). It is inherently
improbable that the testator refrained from revoking his second will in
reliance upon the promise of the wife to abide by the provisions of the
first will. A mere modicum of common sense would dictate simply the
destruction or cancellation of the second will. See again the comments in
supra note 64.
70. The Court pointed out that "Where a document is, upon its face,
susceptible of interpretation as either a will or some other type of instru-
ment, extrinsic evidence is generally admitted to show what the maker
intended it to be,"-citing Wheeler v. Meray, Bail. Eq. 507 (1831), and
Hargroves v. Meray, 2 Hill Eq. 222 (1835), both cases dealing with the
same paper, the question being whether the instrument was a deed or
will. The paper bore three witnesses. Such a situation would seldom
arise, since wills require three witnesses and deeds only two. Prior to
1824, when the Statute of Wills (Frauds) was amended to put wills of
personal property on a parity with wills of real property as to execution,
6 Stat. 238, (so as to require the will to be signed, with three witnesses),
written wills of personal property did not require witnesses, and an un-
witnessed will or one having less than three witnesses was valid. It be-
came difficult at times to determine whether an informal paper, such
as a letter, was intended as a will or not, and the inquiry was as to the
animus testandi. Apparently, if the paper's language was ambiguous,
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test idi established, the will on execution became an effec-
tive testamentary instrument, ambulatory and revocable, a
result which would not be affected by the fact, if it was a
'fact, that the testator had not made up his mind-which will
to use, since (in substance) he may always change his mind
and his will at any time after execution. The Supreie Court
also differed with the lower court's determination that the
1957 will had been revoked by the testator's intention that
it should be revoked, calling attention to the fact that a will
can be revoked only in one of the ways specified by the re-
vocation statute.
71
parol evidence was admissible to show the presence or absence of testa,
mentary intent. McGee v. McCants, 1 MeC. L. 517 (1821); Lyles v. Lyles,
2 N. & McC. L. 531 (1820); Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, 2 MeC. L. 520
(1823). This does not solve entirely the problem of whether, if the instru-
ment is on its face unambiguously a will and executed as such, it may be
shown that it was not intended to operate at all or only conditionally.
In Witherspoon v. Witherspoon, supra, it was said, as dictum:
His [testator's] signature is the act by which he seals his sanction
to the operation it is intended to have; it precludes the idea that
anything more was intended; it is the factum of the thing itself;
and in the language of the definition it is a complete and legal de-
claration of his intention; and in such a case the rule [parol evi-
dence] would operate in full force.
In the present case the Supreme Court felt it unnecessary to pass upon
the question of the admissibility of parol evidence on the issue of the
animus testandi in an instrument unambiguously a will, but stated that
if the evidence to show lack of it were admissible it would have to be
clear, cogent and convincing; and the evidence here offered to disprove
lack of the animus fell short of that standard. See anno 21 A. L. R. (2)
319 (1922) cited by the Court. The problem is an acute one where the
will is attacked for want of animus testandi as a specimen, sham, pre-
tensive, or ritualistic will. The will here is not one of these. It might be
argued that the will is a conditional or contingent will, conditioned in
terms of initial operation only if a particular event should come to pass:
in this case if the testator did not change his mind. Jacks v. Henderson,
1 DeS. Eq. 543 (1797); Capps v. Richardson, 215 S. C. 534, 53 S. E. 2d
876 (1949); 11 A. L. R. 846 (1921); 79 A. L. R. 1168 (1932). The will
here is ruled out as a possible conditional will because in order to stand
up as one the will on its face must show that it was so intended-here the
will was unambiguously unconditional-and parol evidence is not admis-
sible to show that a will absolute on its face was intended to be conditional.
ATKINSON, WILLS § 416 (2d ed. 1953). Even if the will in this case had
said, "This is my will if (or on condition that) I do not change my mind,"
this would not make the will conditional, as the language is no more
than is implied in the case of every will, which by its nature is ambula-
tory and revocable.
71. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-221 (1952). The term
"destroying" in the statute embraces "burning, cancelling, tearing." John.
son v. Brailsford, 2 N. & McC. L. 272 (1820). It is familiar law that
in order to effect revocation there must be both the animus revocandi and
the act; one without the other is insufficient. An intention to revoke at
some future time, even though there are markings on the will indicating
proposed changes, is not enough. Brown v. Shand, 1 McC. L. 409 (1821)
(declarations by testator of dissatisfaction with will, and intention to
change by making new will, not carried out); Means v. Moore, Harper
Law 314 (1824) (will marked). And, even if there is present intent,
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o Turning to the question of the revival of the 1953 will the
Supreme .Court held, in opposition to the lower court, that
the first will had not been revived. The Court affirmed
the doctrine of revival as announced in the Taylor and Kollock
cases, but held that the facts in the present case were not;
similar to the facts in those two cases. The essential point of
difference was that in those cases the second-revoking-will,
had in the one instance been cancelled, and in the other was-
not produced and hence presumptively (the presumptiom
was not overcome) destroyed animo revocandi.
72
failure to do one of the requisite acts prevents revocation, Floyd v. Floyd,.
3 Strob. L. 44 (1848) (revocation prevented by undue influence). As to
act and intent generally see Johnson v. Brailsford, supra.
It seems highly unnatural that a testator with two wills in his possession
who wished his second will not to stand would be content to exact from
his family a promise that the second will should be ineffective and the
first effective. Ordinarily he would merely destroy the second will,
an. act. less involved than leaving the second will intact and procuring a
promise. See the comments in note 69, supra, as to the alleged, promise
to leave the 'second will'in force but to accept the provisions of the first
will. Of course there is a glaring inconsistency between the parties' orig-
inal position that the wife made a promise in order to induce the testator
not to revoke his second will and the later position that it was the under-
standing of the testator and the family that the second will was revoked.
And an equally palpable inconsistency is the wife's actual probating of the
will with her assertion that it had been revoked.
72., The misconception of the lower court grew out of the statement in
the Taylor case that "by the civil law the.first is regarded as annihilated
by the' second; and it requires -other evidence than, a destruction of the
second to revive the first. In both- it is regarded as 'a question of in-
tention, and may be controlled by other evidence." The reference is to
the contrast between the common law rule, which is followed, and the
civil law rule, which is not. Under the civil law rule, originally applicable
to personal property, the mere making of the revoking will revoked the
first will. Under the common law rule, applicable originally to devises,
the making of the revoking will did not by itself produce revocation
of the first. Both the making of the revoking will and its continued
existence to the time of death brought that about, on the principle that since
until death the will, including its revocatory provision, was itself ambula-
tory and revocable, the revocation itself might be Tevoked. (In this context,
the term "revival" or "revivor" is a misnomer, since the first will, if in
existence unmutilated, is not regarded as. affected until the testator dies
leaving in force his later revoking will. It has not in the meantime been
revoked and it therefore needs no reinstatement.) The strict common
law. principle leaves no room for. inquiry into intention. Whether the
testator intended to die intestate, or preferred to leave his first will,
the:first will operated. The less strict common law rule acts to revive
the. first will unless the testator did not intend that' it should be re-
vived-that- is, he desired intestacy. The language in the Taylor case
indicatesf adherence to the qualified; rather than the strict, common law
rule. See 28 A. ,L. R. 912 (1924); 162 A. L. R. 1072 (1946). The Kollook
case merely states that the lower court "Was clearly right in holding that
the courts of this State have adopted the common law rule under Taylor
-v. Taylor. . ." (It is interesting to note that in the A. L. R. annotations
j7pst mentioned the Taylor and Kollock cases are listed as following the
strict common law rule, which excludes intention. The South Carolina
cases, seem to be similarly listed elsewhere. 68 C. J. Wilts § 567 (1934);
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The result of the Supreme Court's decision was to leave
unimpaired the probate and efficacy of the second will, to
nullify the first will, and to reject any trust or interest in-
compatible with the dispositions under the second will. The
result produces a paradox of sorts in that the plaintiffs, while
winning the case on appeal, were left precisely in the same
situation they occupied before starting their action. The
proceeding ended as a salvage operation for the plaintiffs,
and of course for their children, contingent beneficiaries.
73
Anti-climactically, there is another extraordinary aspect
of the case: the failure by both the lower court and the Su-
preme Court to make mention of (though probably not over-
looking) the vital question of the authority or jurisdiction of
the lower court to invalidate the second will and to declare
entitled to probate the first will. The court was clearlyin this
respect exercising probate functions. If the view is taken-
and it would be a distorted one-that the proceedings
were in effect to prove the second or first will, or both, in
2 PAGE, WILLS § 21-54 (Bowe-Parker-Revision 1960); ATKINSON, WILS
§ 92, (2d ed. 1953). The Taylor case purports to follow the leading
English case of Goodright v. Glazer, 4 Burr, 2512, 98 Eng. Reprint 317
(1770); but this case seems not to permit intention to play a part and
to hold that revocation of the revoking will ipso facto revives the earlier
will.) Much of the force of the Taylor case is lost in the fact that the
second will had been obtained through fraud and was invalid from the
start. The intention referred to as controlling the issue of revival is the
intention to revive or not to revive the earlier will. To bring revival into
play, in any event, there must be revocation of the later will; and if there
is no act of revocation, even though the intent is present, the circum-
stances for revival do not exist. The intent which the lower court
evidently had in mind was the intent to revoke the later will. That is
not the intent which may play the vital part in revival.
73. As has been noted, the obstacle that derailed the agreement to
distribute the testator's property according to the 1953 will was the be-
lated discovery that the terms and nature of the estate were not as the
parties had supposed them to be. If they had, the case would not have
proceeded beyond the lower court. The reason for going to court in the
first place was that the mere agreement of the testator's wife and children
could not get rid of the interests of the minor and contingent benefi-
ciaries; and only an action to impose a trust or to vacate the later
will would, if the requested relief were given, supersede and vitiate
any rights seemingly created by the second will. But for the existence
of the contingent rights the mutual promises of the wife and the children
to forego their rights under the second will and to substitute the interests
created under the first will could be sustained on general contract prin-
ciples, and, subject to the Statute of Frauds, as an appropriate family
settlement. Smith v. Williams, 141 S. C. 265, 139 S. E. 625 (1927);
Smith v. Tanner, 32 S. C. 259, 10 S. E. 208 (1889); Huggins v. Price,
96 S. C. 83, 70 S. E. 798 (1913). Where the heirs divide the property
according to the provisions of a defective will, they are estopped to deny
its validity, Miley v. Deer, 93 S. C. 66, 76 S. E. 27 (1912). By analogy
if there had been accepptance of and action under the unprobated, and
revoked, 1953 will, there would be an effective estoppel to deny its force.
[Vol. 14
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solemn form, with the permitted bypassing of the probate
court74 the proceeding would have come too late in view of
the statute limiting such proceedings to six months follow-
ing admission to probate in common form.7 5 The proceed-
ing was demonstrably one in equity, asking for a trust,
although turning later into an attempted impeachment of
one will and the validation of another. It certainly seems to
be well established that once a will has been admitted to
probate by a competent tribunal its validity cannot be ques-
tioned collaterally. 76 There was no effort at the trial, nor
74. Muldrow v. Jeffords, 144 S. C. 509, 142 S. E. 602 (1927). If the
proceeding were really one to prove the second will in solemn form, the
executrix, whose duty it was to uphold the will and who represented all
the beneficiaries, Muldrow v. Jeffords, supra, would not, consistently,
attack it. So far as the first will is concerned, it had not even been
probated in common form, and it would be unusual, to say the least, to
prove it for the first time in this fashion.
While the county court of Greenville County has unlimited juris-
diction (as regards amount of money or value of property) in equitable
actions, Bramlett v. Young, 229 S. C. 519, 93 S. E. 2d 873 (1956), and
could have entertained the action to enforce a trust, it is open to question
whether it had the jurisdiction to try an issue of "will or no will" in view
of the size of the estate, even taking into account the fact that a will
contest is at law, and the county court act limits actions at law in
terms of money or value to actions to recover money or property,
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 15-654, 15-656 (1952 Supp.).
The latter section gives the county court power to entertain appeals from
the probate court on the issue of will or no will where the estate does not
exceed $10,000. It would be a contradiction of sorts if the court were to
have the power to deal with the issue where the probate court was by-
passed, and not to have it when the proceeding took the form of an appeal
from the judgment of the probate court in a solemn form proceeding.
75. CODE OF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-255 (1952). And see
comments on that point in note 16, supra.
76. See the cases in note 16, supra. "Validity" as here employed means
with respect to proper execution, capacity, freedom from undue influence
and fraud, knowledge of contents, and necessarily (except for later re-
voking wills) that the will has not been revoked. Probate does not pre-
clude inquiry into the validity and effect of any or all of the provisions
of the will. These are contructional or internal matters. Hembree v.
Bolton, supra. In cases in which the courts say that a will is void for
uncertainty or indefinitness of provision, the meaning is not that the
will itself is a nullity but that the dispositive provisions cannot be given
effect. Complete intestacy may result without affecting the validity of
the will itself or its probate. This is a constructional (internal) and
not a probate (external) treatment of the will. Before a will can be
scrutinized by a court for construction, it must first have been admitted
to probate, and the probate cannot be affected by the proceeding. Compare
Davenport v. Collins, 161 S. C. 387, 159 S. E. 787 (1931); Meier v.
Meier, 208 S. C. 520, 38 S. E. 2d 762 (1946) ; Prater v. Whittle, 16 S. C.
40 (1881). In Meier v. Meier, which was an action for specific per-
formance of a contract for the sale of land, the defense was that not
only was the language of the probated will under which the plaintiff
claimed so vague as to render the instrument ineffectual as to its dis-
positions but also to negative its existence as a will in the sense of
testamentary intent. The Court said "there can.be no doubt that the
intention of the testator was that this should be his will." The instrument,
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in the exceptions, on the part of plaintiffs' counsel or of the
guardians-ad-litem for the minor defendants, to assail the in-
quiry into the validity of the first or second will, but in
their brief the counsel called attention .to that feature of the
case.7 7 No notice of it was taken by the Supreme Court.
It would appear, however, that the case was converted
entirely into a direct attack upon the second will and into
a direct proceeding to establish the validity of the first. The
authority and jurisdiction of the court to perform these
clearly probate acts is seriously open to question. The law
appears to be well settled generally that a court of equity
can neither set aside a will nor order a will admitted to pro-
bate.78 South Carolina authority is fairly explicit in the same
vein. In Myers v. O'Hanlon70 the Court, as a court of equity,
refused, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, to set up a
will alleged to have been fradulently suppressed and which,
regular in execution, having been admitted to probate some seven or
eight years before, it would seem that the probate precluded any in-
quiry collaterally into testamentary intent. See note 70, supra, the cases
of Wheeler v. Meray, and Hargrove v. Meray, where the paper had not
been offered for probate.
77. Appellants' brief, f. 12, in these words:
There is a further point which is here raised with some hesitancy.
A will once duly admitted to probate cannot be attacked collaterally,
as this will was by the defendant, Mrs. Xadden. This point was not
raised at the trial, nor was it included in the exceptions. The
appellants recognize that they may be prevented from raising. this
issue now. There are however two minor children represented by
guardians ad litem. The interests of these minors, are not of
necessity consistent with the interests of the appellants. These
guardians are not represented by counsel and the appellants feel
under an obligation to point out to the Court the existence of this
further consideration.
The writer ventures no opinion as to whether the failure to call
attention to the collateral character of the inquiry into the wills would
deprive the appellants of their right to raise the question thereafter
or of the right of the appellate court on its own motion to dispose of it.
See the concluding remarks of Justice Blease, in dissent, in Mluldrow v.
Jeffords, supra. In Hammett v. Hammett, supra, which was an action by
executors for instructions, the Supreme Court, after its decision, was
presented with a petition for a stay of remittitur on the ground that
newly discovered evidence disclosed that the testator was of unsound
mind at the time of execution of the will, and that the evidence would
present "an issue material to a just decision of said cause." The Court
declined to hear the petition on the ground that "the evidence is designed
to raise an issue of devisavit vel non, of which issue neither this Court
nor the court of common pleas can now take original jurisdiction."
78. 3 PAGE, WILLS § 26.19 (Bowe-Parker Revision, 1961). "It is
generally held that equity cannot interfere in probate matters in absence
of statute, either to admit a will to probate, or to set it aside." 57 AM.
Jun. Wills § 773 (1948) : It is stated as a general principle that courts
of equity have no jurisdiction of a will contest unless such has. been
conferred by statute."
79. 12 Rich. Eq. 196 (1861).
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it was contended, had revoked an earlier will admitted to pro-
bate many years before, and as to which the time for prov-
ing in solemn form had expired. While refusing to set up
the allegedly suppressed will it also declined to set aside the
probated will, as the complainants had also asked. The chief
bulwark of the court's position was the fairly positive nature
of the Act of 1839 (7 Stat. 56), now embodied, in § 19-255
of the 1952 Code, relating to proceedings in solemn form.80
The critical question arises whether if a court lacks juris-
diction to assume probate functions but nevertheless under-
takes to do so, its judgment is void, and must remain so,
despite the failure of a litigant to challenge the jurisdiction.
In thi case, should the lower court have denied itself the
power to pass upon the questions presented, where no ob-
jection was made or even where the jurisdiction was con-
sented to? And, more important, since the lower court did
not so deny itself, could, or should, the Supreme Court of its
own motion pronounce the nullity of the action of the court
belbw?s0a And, if the judgment below was void and the
Supreme Court should not, for one reason or another, de-
clare it to be so, would the appellate judgment itself be sub-
ject to future attack as itself being void? Questions of this
kind have not gone unnoticed in other cases, but, as they
open up a tremendously wide area of consideration, the writer
offers no opinion upon them. In this case, the questions are
largely academic because, while the case was considered on
the merits, the reversal of the lower court left undisturbed
the probate of the second will and the absence from probate
of the first, the same result that would have followed if the
Court had declared that the lower court had no authority
to disturb the status of the two wills. Still, it is hoped that
the inference will not be drawn from the treatment of the
80. Long before the Act of 1839, the court of equity declined to look
into matters of probate. See Irby v. McCrae, 4 DeS. Eq. 422 (1814). Some
early cases "permitted Equity to take a hand directly by compelling
the executor and persons benefiting by the will to consent to revocation
of the will and allow the heirs to litigate. McDowall v. Peyton, 2
DeSau. Eq. 313 (S. C. 1805); Palmer v. Mikell, 2 DeSau. Eq. 342 (S. C.
1806)." (13 S. C. L. Q. 96, 102, n. 12). In Myers v. O'Hanlon the
Court declared that the Act of 1839 would no longer permit this kind of
equitable action: "It results that the Court cannot interfere in this
case, either by direct relief, or by decreeing that the executor's consent
that the probate of the will ... be revoked." 12 Rich. Eq. at 204.
80a. The Court, however, has at times taken note of the impropriety
of the lower court's allowance of collateral attack and at the same time
dealt with the case on its merits. Davis v. Davis, supra, note 16.
196 1
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case on both the trial and appellate levels that the procedure
(which was not criticized) is an approved or permitted one.
Purchmse Money Resulting Trust
A case that has many facets of the law of purchase money
resulting trusts is Green v. Green.8' Although there was
conflict in the testimony, the facts were reduced to a fair
degree of simplicity by the lower court and the Supreme
Court, and the recital of facts here is as they were found by
both courts.
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1937.
The plaintiff was divorced from her husband, the defendant,
in 1958. In 1943, the defendant-had purchased a house and
lot and had title made to himself and his wife. The initial
payment for the property and the subsequent payments on the
mortgage given by them were all made by the husband. Later,
with the coming of a family, the two undertook, in 1950, to
buy another lot on which to build a larger house. In order
to pay the purchase price, $3,000, they refinanced the mort-
gage on the property, and derived a net of about $2,800.
To this they added an amount drawn from their joint bank
account to make up the price of the new lot. It was found
as a fact that there had been an agreement that the property
should be held jointly, as before, but instead, unknown to
the wife, the husband took title in his sole name. Afterwards
the first house and lot were sold, the existing mortgage paid
off, and a net balance of about $4,900 realized, which was
placed in the joint bank account. The funds were used to-
wards the building of the new house, which was otherwise
financed by a mortgage loan of $16,000. The mortgage was
signed only by the defendant, with the plaintiff renouncing
dower.
In 1959 the plaintiff brought this action, setting out sub-
stantially these facts, and claiming that as a consequence
she was entitled (as the Supreme Court's opinion put it) "to
either a joint interest in the new house and lot or [it] entitled
her to a judgment for monetary contribution thereto, and
also that the Court should decree a resulting trust in her
favor." The defendant in his answer asserted sole ownership
in himself from the outset, that he was the real owner of the
81. 237 S. C. 424, 117 S. E. 2d 583 (1960).
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first property held in the joint names because he had paid
for it, and he was also owner of the proceeds of its sale. He
denied that there was any agreement to take title jointly to
the new lot and building. During the proceeding the lot and
building were sold for $25,000, and one-half of the net pro-
ceeds after payment of the mortgage, or about $5,600, was
deposited in court. The husband was concededly the owner
of the other $5,600, and the final scope of the action was to
determine whether- the plaintiff was entitled to all or any
part of the other half in custody of the court. The lower court
held that the plaintiff, despite the husband's payment for
the first property, was an equal owner with him of it, and
also of the fund which it produced on its refinancing and
on its sale; and it further held that she was entitled to a
resulting trust to the extent of her money which was used
in the purchase of the second lot and in the contribution to
the building of the house upon it.. The lower court, so find-
ing, directed the $5,600 to be disbursed by giving to the wife
the total of the two sums advanced by her--about $3,800-
and by paying the balance of something over $1,700 to the
husband. The husband thus received altogether over $7,300.
(It is to be noticed that the lower court did not order a dis-
tribution on a proportionate basis, a point which will be
discussed later.)
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court. It went over
the same ground as the lower court, but with considerable
elaboration of authority and reasoning. Because of the case's
possibly considerable impact on the law of resulting trusts,
and the conclusions that may be drawn, it will be given de-
tailed analysis.
The first phase of ownership in the case is relatively simple.
The husband's contention that because the consideration
came from him in the purchase of the original house and
lot he was the beneficary of a resulting trust of the interest
held in his wife's name as co-owner, was dismissed. The
Court stated the familiar general rule:
... when real estate is conveyed to one person and the
consideration paid by another, it is presumed that the
party who pays the purchase price intended a benefit to
himself, and accordingly a resulting trust is raised in
his behalf. But, when the conveyance is taken to a wife,
1962]
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for whom the purchaser is under legal obligation to
provide, no such presumption attaches. On the con-
trary, the presumption in such case is that the purchase
was designed as a gift or advancement to the person
to whom the conveyance is made. This presumption is
one of fact, and not of law, and may be rebutted by
parol evidence or circumstances showng a contrary in-
tention8
2
The second phase of ownership, title in the husband alone,
offers some difficulty, not factually but in the application of
pertinent principles. The Court, having stated the necessity
for "clear, definite and convincing" evidence to establish
a resulting trust, concluded that the evidence showing the
payment by the wife towards the purchase price, and her
contribution to the cost of erection of the building, met the
necessary test, 3 and also that the evidence was of a like
and satisfactory character with respect to the understanding
of the parties as to joint ownership. Being thus satisfied
with the proof, the Court found a resulting trust in favor
of the wife.8 4 The husband's contention that the wife had
82. Citing, among other cases dealing with payment by the husband
with title in the wife, Legendre v. S. C, Tax Comm.,. 215 S. C. 514, 56
S. E. 2d 336 (1949). This case, in which the wife paid the coisideration
and had the title taken in the name of herself and her husband, also
seems to hold that, whatever the relationship, if any, where one party
pays the consideration and has title taken in his name and that of
another, the inference is of a gift of the, fractional interest-relying
on RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 441, comment e (1935). A fortiori, when
the husband pays the purchase price and takes title in his and his wife's
names.
83. The high degree of proof called for by the cases is as to the pay-
ment of the purchase money, and not as to corroborative intention, since
the fact of payment once proved gives rise to the implied intention.
84. There is room for argument that a constructive, rather than a
resulting, trust arose, although for most purposes the difference would
not be material. The found fact was, not that the husband agreed to
take title in his sole name for the joint benefit of himself and his wife,
but that he had agreed, in substance, to take title in the joint names of
himself and his wife. They were to be co-owners, without a trust. Instead,
he used her money to take title in his name alone. The misuse of the
wife's money and the abuse of the confidential relationship would, more
plausibly, make the trust constructive. This is the view taken by some
of the authorities: 2A BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 458 (1953)
SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 440.1, 508.1 (2d. ed. 1956); 3 POMEROY, EQurrY JuRis-
rnUDENcE §1037 (4th ed. 1918). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS Vol.
2, p. 392 (1959) Introductory note to Topic 4. The cases divide on the char-
acterization of the trust as resulting or constructive where the agreement
is that title is to be taken in joint names but instead is taken in only one.
See 42 A. L. R. 10, 62 (1906); 135 A. L. R. 232, 241 (1941); 27 A. L. R.
(2) 1285, 1300 (1953). See also Picchi v. Piechi, - Fla....
100 So. 2d 627 (1958): "Where husband and wife buy realty with the
understanding that the title is to be vested in both, and the husband
[Vol.-1264
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made a gift to him of the funds was, the Court held, con-
tradicted by the testimony. His argument was essentially
that a gift by wife to husband would be presumed; but the
Court, while admiing that "a gift from a wife to a husband
may be inferred from the circumstances and the marriage
relationship is a factor to be considered," declared that "This
testimony negates any presumption of such.1
8 5
Because of the fact that the money contributed by the
wife for the construction of the building was advanced after
the title had been acquired by the husband, the defendant
contended that a principal requirement of the purchase money
resulting trust had not been met: the purchase money, or
a definite portion of it, must have been paid at or before
the time of conveyance, and such a trust cannot arise from
subsequent transactions. The Court conceded the existence
of the rule,88 but here it took a significant step forward and
has the deed run to himself alone, he may be made constructive trustee
for the wife as to a half interest." The South Carolina cases dealing with
a .party's taking title in his own name without the consent of the other
are not'precise on the point In the co-adventurer cases, where no money
hav as yet been furnished by the party claiming the trust, the purchase
by the other party in his own name, in violation of an agreement to pur-
chase in the joint -names, has been held to give rise to a constructive
trust.. Webb. v. Searson, 208, S. C. 453, 38 S. E. 2d 654 (1946) (trust
arose); Carmichael v. Huggins, 221 S. C. 278, 70 S. E]. 2d 223 (1952)
(principle recognized, but proof not sufficient). In Ogilvie v. Smith,
215 S. C. 800, 54 S. E. 2d 860 (1949),.plaintiff alleged she had furnished
defendant, her fiance, .part of the funds to buy a car in their joint names,
and defendant bought car in his sole name. It was held that, if the facts
were proved, she was entitled either to recovery of the money furnished
or to a costructive trust or equitable lien. In Goforth v. Goforth, 47 S. C.
126, 25 S. E. 40 (1896), an action for partition, defendant, plaintiff's step-
mother, alleged that the purchase price of the land in suit had been paid
for by her through her husband, who, in violation of agreement, had
taken title in plaintiff's and defendant's names. Held, resulting trust
for defendant in the interest held by plaintiff. Since the resulting trust
is based on the presumed intent of the payor that a trust is to be created
in his favor, it would seem that consent of the payor to the transfer
would be essential. Without consent, therefore, a resulting trust could
hardly arise. See also Richardson v. Day, 20 S. C. 412 (1883).
85. It is submitted that while a gift from wife to husband may be
inferred in some circumstances, there is nevertheless a presumption that
when a wife pays the purchase price and title is taken in the husband's
name, there is no presumption of a gift but rather the presumption of
a trust, which the husband has the burden of overcoming. 4 ScoTr,
TRUSTS § 442 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SECoND), TRUSTS § 442,
comment a (1959) ; 113 A. L. R. 339 (1938). Although the South Carolina
cases are not entirely clear, they on the whole seem to accept this view.
Linnell v. Hudson, 59 S. C. 283, 37 S. E. 927 (1900); Grantham v.
Grantham, 34 S. C. 504, 13 S. E. 675 (1890); Fallaw v. Oswald, 194
S. C. 387, 9 S. E. 2d 793 (1940). In Legendre v. S. C. Tax Comm., supra,
cited by the Court, there is no definite commitment.
86. Citing Surasky v. Weintraub, 90 S. C. 522, 73 S. E. 1029 (1911),
and Hutto v. Hutto, 187 S. C. 36, 196 S. E. 369 (1938). The trust
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added a qualification that has general acceptance: that if
subsequent payment by the trust claimant is made in ful-.
fillment of a previous obligation, at or before the transfer,
to pay, rather than as a new and independent transaction, the
payment requirement is met for the trust.8 7 The evidence
showed that the payment made by the wife was in accordance
with an agreement with her husband at or before the time of
the transfer to him. It should be noted, however, that the
payment made by the wife after her .husband had acquired
title was for the purpose of aiding in the erection of the house
and not for the purpose of acquiring the property. When the
title was acquired, the wife had already furnished all of her
share of its cost; and upon the vesting of title in the husband,,
she then and there became the beneficiary of the resulting
trust. Much of the argument, therefore, as to the effect
upon the creation of the trust by the subsequent payment
is unnecessary, if even relevant ss but the important and
useful fact is .that the rule as to payment made under a
prior obligation has been adopted. It would appear more-
realistic to view the improvements made with the plaintiff's'
money in part as improvements placed on property already
owned by her as a co-tenant and as such forming part of the
realty. Ordinarily, the improving of another's property, or
furnishing the money.for improvements does not create a
purchase money resulting trust, but it would appear that if
the person furnishing the money for improvements already
has an equitable ownership as beneficiary of a resulting
trust the improvements, as part of the realty, likewise be-
arises, if at all, when the conveyance is made; hence subsequent trans-
actions cannot affect the prior status. Many South Carolina cases are
in the same vein. Ez Parte Trenholm, 19 S. C. 126, (1882); Richardson
v. Day, supra; Brown v. Cave, 23 S. C. 251 (1885); Jones v. Hughey,
46 S. C. 193, 24 S. E. 178 (1895); Gaines v. Drakeford, 51 S. C. 37, 27
S. E. 960 (1897); Larisey v. Larisey, 93 S. C. 450, 77 S. E. 129 (1912).
The list is not exclusive,
87. Relying, chiefly, on a dictum in Hutto v. Hutto, supra, quoting
Pomeroy; and citing, among others, 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 457 (1st ed. 1939),
and 54 Am. JuR. Trusts, § 204 (1945). See also, RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND),
TRUSTS §§ 456, 457 (1959). In the latter section it is said: "A resulting
trust does not arise from the payment of the purchase price unless at the
time of the purchase the other person pays the purchase price or agrees.
to pay it." (Italics supplied.) The agreement may be made with the
vendor or with the grantee. 4 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 456 (2d. ed. 1956). Here
the agreement was made with the grantee. The problem of payment
made after transfer is discussed and its resolution foreshadowed in the
1960 Survey. 13 S. C. L. Q. 109-111 (1960).
88. It would have even less relevance if the wife were the beneficiary
of a constructive trust. See note 84, supra.
[Vol. 1
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come subject to the trust with or without agreement.8 9 More-
over, with the real ownership of the property here in both
parties, as the husband must have known, and with the
understanding that the parties were to own both lot and
house as theretofore, as equal co-owners, the improvements
placed upon the property, although in major part paid for
with the husband's funds, might be deemed a gift to the wife
corresponding to her interest as beneficial owner. The plac-
ing of improvements on the land of another, without agree-
ment for compensation, and in full knowledge of the other's
ownership, would at least create the inference that they were
intended as a gift.90
This last phase of the discussion was directed to the pos-
sibility that the wife may have been entitled to more than a
return of her contribution towards the purchase of the lot
and the cost of the building. She, however, asked for that
return as an alternative, and when it was given her she
did not appeal. The Court, holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to the recovery of her monetary contribution stated:
It has been held that where part of the price of the land
was paid by one person and the title taken in the name
of another, a trust resulted in favor of the other only to
89. 80 C. J. S. Trusts § 11 (1953):
A trust does not result in favor of one paying for improvements
on another's land. Since it is the rule that a resulting trust must
arise, if- at all, from the state of facts existing at the time the
legal title to the property is acquired, such a trust cannot be
created by a subsequent expenditure of money in improving the
property...
2A BOGERT, TRUST AND TRUSTEES §§ 455, 456 (1953); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 454.7 (2d ed. 1956): "A resulting trust does not arise in favor of a
person who pays no part of the purchase price, although he pays for
improvements upon the property." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §
454 comment o (1959). See Caulk v. Caulk, 211 S. C. 57, 43 S. E. 2d
600 (1947); Legendre v. S. C. Tax Comm., supra. See also, Four Rivers
Mutual Orchard Co. v. Wood, 166 Ark. 233, 266 S. W. 75 (1924): "One
not contributing to purchase money cannot, by later furnishing funds
for improvements thereon, establish resulting trust." There may be an
inference from the quoted exerpts that if the person furnishing the
money already has an interest through payment or contribution, the
added amount for improvements would be calculable in the extent of the
trust, otherwise not.
90. See Caulk v. Caulk, supra; Legendre v. S. C. Tax Comm., supra;
Bates v. Bates, 213 S. C. 525, 50 S. E. 2d 577 (1948); Carroll v. Britt,
227 S. C. 9, 86 S. E. 2d 612 (1955); Clanton v. Clanton, 229 S. C.
356, 92 S. E. 2d 356 (1956). See also, North British & M. Ins. Co. v.
Sciandra, 256 Ala. 409, 54 So. 2d 764, 27 A. L. R. (2) 1047 (1951), hold-
ing that "One who has only an undivided one-half interest in land, the
other one-half interest being owned by his wife, has title only to an un-
divided one-half interest in a building constructed thereon, although the
funds for the building are supplied by the husband alone."
1962]
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the extent of the payment. In this case, the trial judge
allowed the respondent a resulting trust only to the
extent of her contribution to the purchase price of the
lot and the construction of a dwelling thereon. We
think this holding is correct.
This, apparently, is stating the rule to be that where pay-
ment of part of the purchase price is made, the payor is
entitled to get, or get back, only what he has put in, and not
entitled to an undivided interest in the proportion that the
amount contributed bears to the whole purchase price. The
Court relies upon McGee v. Edwards,91 which speaks of a
resulting trust "to the extent," but it is not certain that
that case and other cases using this or similar language mean
to limit the trust claimant to an interest no greater in money
terms than the amount furnished, which would be practically
in the nature of an equitable lien. What these cases, on the
whole, seem to indicate is that a person paying only a part
of the purchase price is not entitled to a resulting trust as
to the entire property furnished, i.e., complete beneficial
ownership. 92  On the contrary, there are South Carolina
cases that give the payor a proportionate, or pro rata, in-
terest,9 3 and this seems by far to be the prevailing rule.94
91. 52 S. C. 472, 30 S. E. 602 (1898), mistakenly rdferred to as
McGee v. Edwards but is McGee v. Wells.
92. Mfiims v. Chandler, 21 S. C. 480 (1884)-"to the extent of payment";
Odom v. Beverly, 32 S. C. 107, 10 S. E. 835 (1889)-"to extent of pay-
ment"; Bell v. Edwards, 78 S. C. 490,,59 S. E. 535 (1907)--"to that
extent"; Dumas v. Carroll, 112 S. C. 284, 99 S. E. 801 (1919) -"pro tanto."
93. Lord v. Lowry, Bail. Eq. 510 (1831); Miller v. Saxton, 75 S. C.
237, 55 S. E. 310 (1906) ;, Fallaw v. Oswald, supra, note 85.
94. 89 C. J. S., Trusts § 122 (1955); 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 454 (2d ed.'
1956); PomEROY, ibid, § 1038. In RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §
454 (1959), it is said:
Where a transfer of property is made to one- person and a part*
of the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting trust arises
in favor of the person by whom such payment is made in such*
proportion as the part paid by him bears to the total purchase price,
unless he manifests an intention that no resulting trust should arise
or that a resulting trust to that extent should not arise.
This of course, is not only a matter of natural inference, or presumed in-
tention on the part of the payor, but it is the fair and just supposition.-
Indeed, it would seem that the requirement that, if the whole purchase
price is not paid by the claimant, a definite part must be, is tied to
the notion that unless a definite part is known there can be no known
corresponding interest, pro rata, in the property. See, 1 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 271 (13th ed. 1939). If A pays $1,000 and B pays $1,000
to buy land, title to which is taken in B's name, the reasonable inference,
which may be reinforced by showing of actual intent, is that A is to
have a one-half interest. If the property increased in value to $5,000,
it could not convincingly be argued that A was entitled only to an
interest amounting to $1,000; or that when the property was sold at
[Vol. 14
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In the present case there hardly seems a doubt that when
.the. title was acquired by the' husband, if a resulting trust did
arise, the wife .acquired. a one-half. interest because of the
equality of her contribution. More difficulty is experienced
with the contribution to the erection of the building; and
whether the wife would be entitled to a trust interest pro-
poftionate to her share of the entire cost, or limited to a
'lien in, the amount advanced on the share of her husband,
is a matter of 'interesting conjecture and perhaps compli-
cated arithmetic.95 This assumes, of course, that there is
no acceptance of the premise which has been suggested that
she was entitled to a one-half interest in both the lot and its
imlirovements. As difficult as the problem may seem to be,
it may be worth considering the case merely as one of par-
tition between c0-tenants' (albeit of equitable ownership)
with offsets for improvements:
Another feature of the case needs to be noted, the question
of the admissibility of the evidence of the parties' oral agree-
ment as to the joint holding of the property. The defendant
objected to the evidence as violative of the Statute of Frauds
relating to the proof of express trusts of land,90 but the ob-
jection was overruled by the lower court. This action was
sustained by the Supreme Court, which said:
We think that under the authority of Brown v. Cave97
... the evidence as to the agreement was properly ad-
mitted and considered by the trial judge, for the reason
that increased value A could reach only $1,000 of the proceeds. Similarly,
if the property declined in value to $1,000, A, if the property were sold
at that figure, could not claim the entire $1,000. To fix the interest at
$1,000, unchangeably, would be to create an equitable lien rather than
a resulting trust. The trust is not a lien, and while in some cases a
person may have a choice between a constructive trust and an equitable
lien, there would not seem to be such a choice between a resulting trust
and a lien; although, it must be admitted, some South Carolina cases
not involving purchase money trusts seem either to cut down (though
not in terms) a resulting trust to a lien, Green v. Green, 56 S. C. 193,
34 S. E. 249 (1899), or to give a choice, Walker v. Taylor, 104 S. C.
1, 88 S. E. 300 (1915), in which, however, there was award of a pro-
portionate interest. See also, relying on Green v. Green, Buist v. Williams
88 S. C. 252, 70 S. E. 817 (1910).
95. See also Mayer v. Kane, 69 N. J. Eq. 733, 61 AUt. 374 (1905), in
which a husband without his wife's knowledge, used her money and his
money to buy property in his name -and made improvements at his
cost. The wife was allowed a resulting trust of a proportionate interest,
but the husband was allowed a lien for the amount he expended for im-
provements.
96. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA. § 67-1 (1952).
97. Supra, note 86.
1KgJ 269
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that the testimony showed full performance of the con-
tract on the part of the respondent, which would take
the case out of the Statute of Frauds. In the cited case,
it is said:
"But if there should be any serious difficulty as to the
proof to raise a resulting trust, it would seem that there
can be no doubt that there was ample proof to take the
case out of the Statute of Frauds by part performance.
'It is well settled that the court of equity will enforce
specific performance of a contract within the statute
when the parol contract has been partly carried into
execution .... ' We think the possession of the parties
of their respective shares with the knowledge and con-
sent of [the holder of the legal title], the improvements,
and cultivation of the same without notice or warning,
considered in connection with all the circumstances,
and explicitly the payment of the purchase price were
sufficient evidence to take the case out of the statute."
In the case quoted from, title to land was taken by a father
whose four sons claimed .equitable ownership of a four-fifths
interest on account of an alleged oral agreement that the
father was to hold the land in trust for his sons and him-
self, the sons having contributed to the purchase. Because
of the requirement that the claimant must show payment of
the purchase price or a definite portion of iAl and because
there might, in this case, be difficulty in proving such de-
finite payment-and consequent difficulty in establishing
the resulting trust-the Court nevertheless permitted the
sons to prove the express oral agreement on the basis of
part performance. It is to be observed, therefore, that the
doctrine of part performance, or full execution, has no rel-
evance, so far as the Statute of Frauds is concerned, in prov-
ing a purchase money resulting trust. If full performance
by payment of the purchase money could remove an oral
express trust of land from the operation of the Statute of
Frauds, there would be no need to resort to the doctrine of
resulting trusts to establish a trust where the claimant had
paid the purchase price pursuant to an oral agreement that
the transferee was to hold for the payor's benefit. And, if
this were so, the payment could be made after the transfer,
and the oral agreement could go beyond what the law would
[Vol. 14
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imply from the fact of payment.93 It is to be admitted that
an express oral trust of land may be removed from the Stat-
ute of Frauds by part performance, but the requirements of
part performance to establish such a trust in the face of the
statute are substantially the same as those to establish a
contract for the transfer of an interest in land; and there
payment of the consideration alone is not sufficient0 9 And
if, with or without the payment of the purchase money,
there are other acts of performance by the beneficiary, such
as possession and improvements, these acts, as with similar
acts in relation to contracts for the sale of an interest in
land, 100 will remove an oral express trust from the Statute
of Frauds relating to the proof of such trusts. 10 '
In the light of these principles, it is difficult to justify,
in the case under review, the admission of the evidence of
the oral agreement of the parties on the basis of "full per-
-formance" on the wife's part; and no pretense is made that
her co-occupancy of the premises or furnishing part of the
money for improvements were such acts, referable to the
trust agreement, as to constitute part performance other-
wise. Although the reason advanced by the Court for allow-
ing proof of the agreement may thus be subject to criticism,
there is nevertheless no denying that the evidence was prop-
98. The rule in, purchase money resulting trusts is that an oral agree-
ment is not admissible to the extent that it goes beyond the implication.
For example, if the payor furnished only one-half the purchase price,
an oral agreement that the transferee was to hold in trust the whole
interest acquired by him would go beyond what the law would imply,
a pro rata interest, and therefore could not be shown for that purpose.
Bell v. Edwards, supra. See also Surasky v. Weintraub, supra; 4 SCoTT,
TRUSTS § 454.1 (2d ed. 1956).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 50 (1959); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 197 (1932); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 50 (2d ed. 1956); 1 BOGERT,
ibid, § 92 (1935). The South Carolina cases holding that payment of
all or part of the purchase price, without more, is insufficient to remove
the oral contract of sale from the statute are numerous. See, among
others, Scurry v. Edwards, 232 S. C. 53, 100 S. E. 2d 812 (1957).
100. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 197 (1932); Aust v. Beard, 230 S. C.
515, 96 S. E. 2d 558 (1957); Scurry v. Edwards, supra, note 99.
101. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 67-1 (1952); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 50 (1959); Massey v. McIlwaine, 2 Hill Eq. 421
(1836); Coney v. Timmons, 16 S. C. 378 (1881); Brown v. Cave, supra.
There has been a tendency on the part of the South Carolina courts in
some cases not to discriminate 'between the Statute of Frauds relating
to trusts of land, CODE OF LAwS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 67-1 (1952), and
the general, ot 4th section, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 11-101
(1952), relating to contracts for the transfer of an interest of land,
and to treat trust promises as falling under the latter section. See
Stuckey v. Truette, 124 S. C. 122, 117 S. E. 192 (1922); McMillan v.
King, 193 S. C. 14, 7 S. E. 2d 521 (1940); Scott v. Scott, 216 S. C. 280,
57 S. E. 2d 470 (1950).
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erly let in, but for reasons applicable, peculiarly to the put-
chase money trust. The general rule- is that an oral express
trust is unenforceable as such, but its existence does not
negative or defeat the purchase money resulting trust, and
the oral trust may be introduced in order to corroborate the
resulting trust when the holder of the title denies that it has
arisen.10 2 For all practical purposes effect is given to the
express trust, since the same result is, attained. The Statute
of Frauds does not stand in the way of establishing the re-
sulting trust, since, by another section 03 trusts arising
by "implication or construction of law" (resulting and con-
structive) 10 4 may be proved without a writing; and as evi-
dence, including agreements, may be given to rebut the trust
in whole or in part, so may it be given to support the trust.
South Carolina authority is in accord with the general rule, 05
and the fact that a purchase money resulting trust may be
involved is ground alone to permit showing what the agree-
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 441, comment j (1959):
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the pur-
chase price is paid by another, the fact that the payor and the
transferee made an oral agreement unenforceable under the Statute
of Frauds or otherwise that the property should be held under an
express trust for the payor does not prevent a resulting trust
from arising in favor of the payor. In such a case, although the
oral agreement is not enforceable as such, it does not rebut but on
the contrary supports the inference that the payor did not intend
that the transferee should have the beneficial interest in the prop-
erty.
To the same effect, see 4 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 441.2 (2d ed. 1956); 2A
BOGaRT, ibid, § 505 (1953); 89 C. J. S. Thusts, § 133 (1955); 42 A. L. R.
10, 55 (1926).
103. CODE, OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 67-3 (1952).
104. If, as has been suggested earlier, the trust here was a constructive
trust, the oral agreement of the parties could be shown. The rationale
is the same: not to enforce the express trust but to show the facts
giving rise to the constructive trust. See also Webb v. Searson, supra, note
84.
105. Brown v. Cave, supra, in which proof was allowed, but ultimately
resorted to for establishing express trust through part performance
(discussed earlier); Feaster v. Kendall, 80 S. C. 30, 61 S. E. 200 (1907),
proof allowed but unsatisfactory; Bell v. Edwards, supra note; Caulk v.
Caulk, supra note. A good expression of the principle appears in Larisey v.
Larisey, supra, at p. 454:
The trust arises upon the presumed intention of him who pays
the purchase money. The presumption, however, may not be in
accord with the truth. In other words, the intention* which is
presumed may not be the actual intention. It follows that the pre-
sumption may be rebutted, 'and the actual intention shown. by
parol evidence . . . . it follows logically that if the presump-
tion may be wholly rebutted by parol evidence, it =ay be
strengthened by such evidence. .." (Italics supplied.) Similarly,
if the presumption is that of gift, it may be rebutted by showing
an oral agreement to hold in trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 443, comment a (1959), and the cases just cited.
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ment of the parties was, either in rebuttal or confirmation
of whatever presumption may have arisen.
Trusts -Merger
An interesting case involving merger and the devolution
of a deceased trustee's title is Deschamps v. Southern Coat-
ing and Chemicals Co.10 6 The action was brought by the
plaintiff, as vendor, to compel specific performance of a con-
tract to buy land entered into between him and the defend-
ant. The defendant's answer justified its refusal to accept
a deed on the ground that the plaintiff was not the owner
in fee simple. The plaintiff filed a reply in which he set out
these facts: that the plaintiff had purchased the tract in
question some years before at a judicial sale and had had
the property conveyed by the master to his mother, as trustee;
that the reason was that at the time of the execution of the
deed he was in South America; that the deed was upon the
trust that the trustee should borrow $2,500, to be secured
by a mortgage, to be repaid in five years, and "in trust,
further, to have, manage and control the said property for
the use and benefit of J. Wilcox Deschamps [the plaintiff]
and his heirs and assigns, subject to the lien of the mortgage
so execiuted for part of the purchase price"; that in the
event of the death, inability or resignation of the trustee, the
plaintiff might substitute another person as trustee; that the
trustee had died and no substitute trustee had been appointed
because there were no duties to perform. The reply con-
cluded with the assertion that the trust had become a passive
trust and that the plaintiff had on that account become the
holder of the fee simple title.
The case was considered by the trial judge on the pleadings
and on the admitted facts, covering substantially the same
ground as those set out in the reply, with the additional
fact that the mortgage mentioned in the trust had been paid
off, and the finding that the trustee having died she was
succeeded in title by the plaintiff, her eldest son. The court
agreed with the contention of the plaintiff, in his reply, that
the trust had become passive and the plaintiff, under the
statute of uses,107 had become the owner in fee simple. The
defendant's chief contention was that the provision in the
106. 236 S. C. 420, 114 S. E. 2d 265 (1960).
107. CODE OF LAws OF SoUTH CAROLINA § 67-8 (1952).
19621
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trust that the trustee was to "manage and control" the
property rendered the trust active, even after the death of
the trustee, and prevented the operation of the statute. To
this the lower court responded that the sole purpose of the
trust was to facilitate the execution of the purchase money
mortgage, and that despite the terms "ranage and control"
no management or control was necessary. The court also
concluded that "substituting a new trustee would accomplish
nothing because the trustee has no power of sale and, if the
terms of the trust were strictly followed, it would have to
,continue in perpetuity and the property could never be sold
or mortgaged."
On appeal from the decree of the lower court, the defend-
.ant excepted on the same ground it had raised below, that
the trust was active. The plaintiff-respondent offered an
additional sustaining ground, namely, that the plaintiff being
the sole beneficiary and having succeeded as his mother's
eldest son to her title as trustee, a merger resulted which
extinguished the trust.
The Supreme Court, after setting out the substance of the
decree below, which has been here summarized and quoted
from, affirmed the lower court, and stated:
There is no appeal from the finding that plaintiff suc-
ceeded his mother as trustee by operation of law; there-
fore, he is trustee for himself and being the beneficiary
of the trust is absolute owner of the share of the estate
equal to his interest. See Black v. Harman, 127 S. C.
359, 120 S. E. 705 [1923], and Foster v. Glover, 46 S. C.
522, 24 S. E. 370, 376, [1895] which states:
"... . If a person should grant land to A, in fee, trust
for A, could any doubt that the grantor intended that
A should have the fee? Would it not be equally certain,
if he should convey the land in fee to A, in trust for A,
B, C, D, and E, that the grantor intended A to have an
estate in fee in one-fifth of the land ?"
The interest of the beneficiary being the entire estate for
his use and that of his heirs and assigns, we are of
opinion that plaintiff has a fee simple title to the pre-
mises in question, that all exceptions should be dis-
missed . . .
It is not precisely clear whether in dismissing the excep-
tions and affirming, the Court, particularly in the light of
274 [Vol. 1-4
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the concluding paragraph, disposed of the case solely on
the ground of merger or on the additional ground of the
execution of the trust by the statute of uses. In any event,
attention should be called to the decree's statement, which
may or may not have been accepted by the Supreme Court,
that "if the terms of the trust were strictly followed, it would
have to continue in perpetuity, and the property could never-
be sold or mortgaged." It should be pointed out that, aside
from the difficulty of creating a private trust to last forever,
the plaintiff, as sole beneficiary, 0 8 had the power to compel
termination of the trust at any time; 1 09 and, unquestionably,
as both settlor and beneficiary, not to mention his also being
trustee by succession, he would have the power to force
termination. 110 The statement that the property could never
be sold or mortgaged is true only insofar as it means that
the trustee would not have the power to sell or mort-
gage'simply by virtue of his office,"' but in a proper case
a court of equity could authorize a sale or mortgage," 2 and,
even without court sanction, consent by the beneficiary or
ratification by him would preclude any later attack upon
the trustee's act of selling or mortgaging."i 3 Even if the
trust here did not become passive on the discharge of the
purchase money mortgage authorized by the deed, the bene-
108. This, of course, is the reasonable construction. The "heirs" of
the beneficiary named would hardly be regarded as beneficiaries also;
and "heirs and assigns" are patently used to characterize the fee char-
acter of the plaintiff's estate. Presently the plaintiff has no heirs (no
man is heir to the living) but it would be interesting to speculate
whether, on the plaintiff's death, his heirs might assert an interest on
the ground that they were beneficiaries whose rights could not be affected
by a proceeding to which they were not parties. If they should, however,
the outcome is reasonably predictable.
109. Kennedy v. Badgett, 19 S. C. 591 (1883); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 337 (1959); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 337 (2d ed. 1956); 45 A. L. R.
743 (1926); 123 A. L. R. 1427 (1939); 163 A. L. R. 852 (1946).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 339 (1959); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 339 (2d ed. 1956). See also Linder v. Nicholson Bank & Trust Co.,
170 S. C. 373, 170 S. E. 429 (1933). The settlor-beneficiary may compel
termination even though a material purpose of the trust has not been
accomplished.
111. The cases are numerous. See Thomson v. Peake, 38 S. C. 440,
17 S. E. 45 (1892) (sale); Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S. C. 287, 26 S. E.
2d 821 (1943) (sale); Chapman v. Williams, 112 S. C. 402, 100 S. E.
360 (1919) (mortgage); Mathews v. Heyward, 2 S. C. 239 (1870)
(mortgage).
112. There are many cases to that effect. See Patton v. First Presby-
terian Church, 129 S. C. 15, 123 S. E. 493 (1924) (sale); Wingard v. Hen-
nesee, 206 S. C. 159, 33 S. E. 2d 390 (1945) (sale); Fraser v. Fishburne, 4
S. C. 314 (1873) (mortgage).
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 216 (1959); Pickett v. Geer,
156 S. C. 346, 153 S. E. 349 (1930).
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ficiary had it in his power to bring the trust to an end at any
time; and since he was trustee also he could, independently
of merger, produce the termination of the trust without seek-
ing court compulsion, since the effect of court action would
be direction to the trustee to transfer the title or simply to
declare the trust at an end with legal title in the beneficiary.
Looking to the issue of extinguishment of the trust by mer-
ger, it is to be noted that it had been found as a fact, from
which there was no appeal and therefore accepted, that the
plaintiff "succeeded his mother as trustee by operation of
law" as her oldest son. It is the law, virtually peculiar to
South Carolina, that on the death intestate of a trustee of
real estate, the legal title to the trust property descends, not
under the statute of descent and distributions, but as at
common law, with the rule of primogeniture." 4 It does not
appear from the record whether the trustee in the present
case died intestate or testate. If she died testate, the eldest
son might not take, since generally the devisee, rather than
the heir, will succeed to the trustee's title, a matter which,
however, is in some doubt in this state.115
With the legal and equitable title thus in the beneficiary,
the inevitable result, as the Court held, was to effect a mer-
ger, although, unlike the usual case, the accession of the
legal title came about by operation of law. The merger re-
sults in a termination of the trust, with absolute ownership
in the beneficiary.1 6 The case of Foster v. Glover, supra,
114. Martin v. Price, 2 Rich. Eq. 412 (1846), the leading case; Kirton
v. Howard, 137 S. C. 11, 134 S. E. 859 (1926). See 1 S. C. L. Q. 367,
396 (1949). Generally the rule elsewhere is that the legal title descends
to the statutory heirs. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 104 (1959);
1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 104 (2d ed. 1956).
115. See I S. C. L. Q. 367, 407 (1949), and the cases there cited;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 105 (1959); 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 105
(2d ed. 1956).
116. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 341 (1959); 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS
§ 341 (2d ed. 1956) where it is said: "The merger of the equitable and
legal interests in the trust property may result where, by operation of
law, the entire beneficial interest passes to the trustee, or when by opera-
tion of the law the legal title passes to the sole beneficiary of the trust."
It would seem, however, that merger will not take place in all cases.
Thus, if A were trustee for his eldest son B, a minor, and A died intestate,
it is hardly to be supposed that a merger would take place and the trust
terminate. Both interests would resid6 separately in the son at least
until the legal interest was put into a substitute trustee. In a federal
case arising from South Carolina, Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele,
232 Fed. 10 (4th Cir. W.D.S.C. 1916), merger which might otherwise take
place by operation of law was prevented in order to respect intent and to
preserve the interests of other parties. The trust, created by will, in
[Vol. 14
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from which the Court quotes and which it uses as the basis
for its holding of merger, is not altogether a satisfactory
one in this respect. The case did not involve a sole beneficiary
who was also the sole trustee,117 although its conclusion is
based upon the analogy to that situation. The major premise,
though not the result, in Foster v. Glover is not one that
appeals to reason:
If a person should grant land to A, in fee, in trust for
A, could any one doubt that the grantor intended that
A should have the fee? Would it not be equally certain
that if he should convey the land to A, in trust for A, B,
C, D, and E, that the grantor intended A to have an
estate in fee in one-fifth of the land?
(The reference to "fee" is to a legal, rather than an equitable,
fee.) The truth would appear to be just the contrary-that he
did not intend the property to be held absolutely. To give
one an absolute legal estate through the medium of a trust,
to be defeated by merger, is too circuitous a route to
reach a point which could be arrived at by a direct non-
trust transfer. If the trust is defeated, it is not because of
intehtion, but in opposition to it and by force of law. The
settlor who creates a passive trust of land intends a trust,
but the statute of uses makes the trust a nullity. The settlor
who makes the sole beneficiary also the sole trustee intends
a trust, not an estate free from it, but the law produces the
merger. And it would seem almost an absurdity that a settlor,
substance was to A in trust Ior B for life and then to convey to B's
heirs. B was A's oldest son. A died intestate. It was held that merger
did not take place so as to give B the entire estate in fee.
117. There seem to be no cases in South Carolina (other than the
present one) in which the situation of sole beneficiary and sole trustee
appears. One case of several beneficiaries who were also trustees is
Industrial Equipment Co. v. Montague, 224 S. C. 510, 80 S. E. 2d 114
(1954), in which the Court held that no trust existed on that account.
It is implicit in Board of Directors v. Lowrance, 126 S. C. 89, 119 S. E.
383 (1923), that there is no trust where the beneficiary and trustee are
one, because after proceeding on the assumption of no trust in such a case
after a recital of many authorities, the Court declared no trust to exist
as to one of several beneficiaries who was also the trustee. This was
followed in the like situation of a trustee who was one of the beneficiaries
in Lynch v. Lynch, 161 S. C. 170, 159 S. E. 26 (1931). On the other
hand, in several other cases, merger did not take place where the trustee
was a life beneficiary along with other beneficiaries. Hunter v. Hunter,
58 S. C. 382, 36 S. E. 734 (1900) ; Folk v. Hughes, 100 S. C. 220, 84 S. E.
713 (1914); Black v. Harman, 127 S. C. 359, 120 S. E. 705 (1923),
cited by the Court in the present case. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS
§§ 99, 115 (1959) [See also, 1 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 99, 115, (2d ed. 1956)]
states that no trust is created only when the sole beneficiary is also the
sole trustee. In all other cases merger does not take place.
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as in Foster v. Glover, intended, through the creation of a
trust, to give the trustee-beneficiary an absolute interest
along with other beneficiaries whose interests, if the trust
were active, would be equitable. (In this case, the trust was
passive as to all the beneficiaries.) Far from giving effect
to the real intention, the Court has, in some instances, where
the trustee was one of several beneficiaries; disregarded the
intention, though, fortunately, not to the harm of others.118
There should be no merger where others would be adversely
affected. For example, if A held in trust for A and B under
a trust which authorized A to sell, if there was merger A
would hold a one-half interest free of trust and the other
half in trust for B. If a judgment had been obtained and
entered against A, it would constitute a lien on A's absolute
undivided interest, making the title unmarketable, and not
only impairing the trust but injuriously affecting the in-
terest of the other beneficiary.
LEGISLATION
Filing of Claims
The statute relating to the filing of claims against a de-
cedent's estate'1 9 has been amentded120 so as to clearly make
the statute one of non-claim. The Act of 1943,121 the parent
act, was plainly in terms a non-claim statute, providing that
"all claims of creditors of such estate shall, upon 'the ex-
piration of eleven months ifter the first publication of the
notice [for creditors] . . . be forever barred unless before
the expiration of such period an account thereof shall have
been filed . . . ." In 1956, as part of extensive legislation
designed to shorten the period of administration, the statute
embodying the Act of 1943 was amended12 2 to read: "All
claims.., shall not later than the expiration of five months
after the publication of the notice [for creditors] . . . be
filed, duly attested, with such executor or administrator or
with the judge of probate of the county in which such estate
is being administered .... " Unlike the earlier version there
was no specification that failure to present a claim would
118. Board of Directors v. Lowrance, supra; Lynch v. Lynch, supra.
119. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 19-474 (1952).
120. Act No. 149 of 1961.
121. 43 Stat. 260, thereafter carried in the CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA as § 19-474 (1952).
122. 49 Stat. 1787.
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bar; and therefore there has been the possibility that, with
this omission, the statute had ceased to be one of non-claim
and would not prevent action upon a claim not presented with-
in the period, as was the case prior to 1943.123 The 1961
amendment provides: "All claims of creditors of such estate
shall upon the expiration of five months after the first
publication of the notice [for creditors] ... . be barred unless
before the expiration of such period an account thereof ...
shall have-been filed . . . " The amendment removes any
doubt as to the effect of the-failure to present a claim within
the specified timeand- with certainty makes the statute one
of non-claim.
In the 1943, .1956, and 1961 versions, there is and remains
this provision :- "But the provisions of this section shall not
apply. to obligations -secured by mortgages or other liens
which have been duly-recorded prior to the expiration of such
period' The proviso is discriminatory and rather pointless.
Since recording is designed -for the protection of subsequent
parties, and nQne are involved here, the fact of recording,
or failure to record, should be, of no consequence. As a rule
lien creditors are in any event protected as to their liens
without .presenting their claims ;124 and they should not, be-
cause they have recorded their security, be put in a better
position as to general assets than ordinary unsecured cred-
itors or secured creditors whose liens are not recorded.
Discharge of Fiduciary
The statute relating to the procedure for final discharge
of a fiduciary by the probate court 25 has been amended
by the 1961 General Assembly 126 in an important respect.
Before its amendment the statute provided for one month's
published notice of application for discharge, and contained
this proviso: "No such discharge shall affect any distributee,
legatee, cestui que trust, ward or lunatic who has not been
made a party to such application, either by personal service
of the notice or by publication in the mode provided for
123. See Karesh, Wills and Trusts, 1958 Survey of S. C. Law, 11
S. C. L. Q. 155, 159 (1958). For a typical case applying the law before
1943, see Columbia Theological Seminary v. Arnette, 168 S. C. 272, 167
S. E. 465 (1932) ; and for a discussion of the 1943 act see 2 S. C. L. Q. 354
(1950).
124. 34 C. J. S. Execs. & Adms. § 403 (1942) ; 78 A. L. R. 1127 (1932).
See 2 S. C. L. Q. 354 (1950).
125. CODE OF LA Ws OF SoUTH CARoLINA § 15-461 (1952).
126. Act No. 180 of 1961.
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absent defendants." The 1961 amendment deletes the words
"who has not been made a party to such publication, either
by personal service of the notice, or by publication in the
mode provided for absent defendants," and in its place are
inserted the words "unless the provisions of this section are
complied with." The effect of the amendment, therefore,
is to make only newspaper notice a condition precedent to
the granting of the discharge. Although publication of the
application has always taken place, the requirement for per-
sonal notice has been, in practice, more honored in the breach
than in the observance; and the amendment legitimizes the
breach.
Whether the amendment is a wise one will not be sub-
jected to opinion, but it is proper to note that it makes a
departure from a mandate, even though unobserved, of long
standing. The requirement for newspaper notice was first
dictated by statute in 1869.127 It contained no provision for
service of notice on beneficiaries or their representatives.
Yet, in 1881, in Roberts v. JohnS,128 it was held that the
statute made newspaper notice a condition precedent but did
not dispense with direct notice to the affected parties; in
other words, that the statute only added a new requirement.
The Court said:
Persons, to be bound by the judgment of the probate
court upon the final, accounts of a fidiciary, must be
made parties thereto by proper proceedings and estab-
lished forms of citations or summons. . . . That legis-
lation would be open to grave objection which would
provide that any persons, but especially infants, lunatics
and non-residents, may be made parties to an action in
court, and be bound by its judgment, by the single publi-
cation for one month of a notice in a newspaper re-
quiring them to appear and show cause. Yet this act
makes no e;ception in favor of infants, lunatics, parties
under disabilities and non-residents.
1 2
127. 14 Stat. 263, re-enacted in Gen. Stat. XXIV, § 4.
128. 16 S. C. 171 (1881).
129. It is to be observed, however, that there is no service of process,
only publication and posting of citation, in proceedings on application
for appointment of an administrator. CODE OF LAWS OF SouTH CARoLiNA
1952 § 19-409; Ex parte White, 38 S. C. 41, 16 S. E. 286 (1892), in
which it was held that the fact that an interested party had no know-
ledge of publication of citation was immaterial. There is not even a
requirement for citation or publication in proving a will in common
form. CODE OF LAWS OF SoUTH CAROLINA § 19-253 (1952).
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An act will not be so construed as to increase rather
than correct an evil intended to be remedied, unless the
words of the act, in plain language or by necessary
implication, exclude a more reasonable interpretation.
... The law here is evidently intended as an additional
protection to cestuis que trust, instead of a deprivation
of the protection they already enjoyed against trustees,
under well-considered acts of legislation, and under the
wise rules by which the practice of our courts were and
are and ought to be regulated.
Having thus construed the statute, the Court in this case
held that although there had been newspaper notice, the
failure to serve the notice of application nullified the dis-
charge granted by the probate court.
In 1893 the proviso for service of notice, in the form
identical with that appearing in the statute until amended
in 1961, was enacted.130 In view of what was said and held
in Roberts v. Johns, the addition of the proviso was no more
than a declaration of existing law. It* is fairly clear, as
already. suggested, that the purpose of the. 1961 amendment
is to dispense with the requirement for personal notice;
but, as a matter of statutory construction, whether repealing
a statute, or portion of a statute, which was only declaratory
of the law before its passage, acts to nullify the previous
law or to restore it is a question of interest, but it will not
be pursued here.
Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act
The Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, which
was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in 1960, was adopted by the South
Carolina General Assembly at its 1961 session.131 As ex-
plained by the Committee of the Commissioners for the
act,182 the main feature of the act is that it "permits the
pour-over of the property by the will into an existing trust,
even though the trust is one which can be revoked or amend-
ed." In terms the act provides: "The devise or bequest
shall not be invalid because the trust is revocable or amend-
130. Rev. Stat. 1893, Code Civ. Proc., § 41.
131. Act No. 163 of 1961.
132. 1960 Handbook 198.
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able, or both, or because the trust was amended after the
execution of the will or the death of the testator."
The Uniform Act, as promulgated by the Commissioners,
and as submitted to the General Assembly by its sponsors, in
the first sentence of the first section reads as follows:
A devise or bequest, the validity of which is determin-
able by the law of this state, may be made-by a will to
the trustee or trustees of a trust established or to be
established by the testator or by the testator and: some
other person or persons or by some other person or per-
sons (including a funded or 'unfunded life insurance
trust, although the trustor has reserved 'any or all rights
of ownership of the insurance contract.) if the trust
is identified in the testator's will and* itg terms dre'eet
forth in a written instrument (other than a -will) ex-
ecuted before or concurrently with the execution of the
testator's will or in the valid last'will of a:person who
has predeceased the testator (regardless of the existence,
size, or character of the corpus of the trust).133
When the proferred act passed through the drafting process,
the language quoted was transformed through error into
language somewhat different; and through oversight of the
sponsors, including this writer, the act was allowed to pass in
its altered form. As enacted, the act's first sentence reads:
A devise or bequest, the validity of which is determin-
able by law of this State, may be made by a will to the
trustee of a trust identified by the testator's will and its
terms set forth in a written instrument other than a
will executed before or concurrently with the execution
of the testator's will or in the valid last will of a person
who has predeceased the testator, regardless of the
existence, size or character of the corpus of the trust
and including a funded or unfunded trust even though
the trustor has reserved any or all rights of ownership
of the insurance contracts.
It will be noticed that the changes are fairly material. The
purpose of the act, as originally promulgated, is to extend
the pour-over provisions not only to an inter vivos trust es-
tablished by the testator (which is the usual case) but to
133. Id. at 199.
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trusts created by him and others, and to trusts created by
others entirely. The language of the act as adopted may be
broad enough, by construction, to embrace all these, but the
drafters of the original act were careful to spell out the
categories of trusts to which the act applied. In addition,
although the context throws light on what is meant by
"funded or unfunded trust," the term "life insurance" as a
modifier has been omitted. Undoubtedly, for the sake of
uniformity, since the act is a Uniform Act, and clarity, the
act -will be amended promptly to embody the language of the
National Conference of Commissioners.
The committee for the act points out that the Uniform
Act (after the first sentence there are no other changes in
the adopted act) will remove uncertainty in those states in
which the law is unsettled. Since the law is unsettled in
South- Carolina, the act performs a most useful service. The
problem essentially is whether a pour-over into an amend-
able trust will follow the trust, as amended after the execu-
tion of the will. If the only theory utilized is that of incor-
poration by reference-that is, incorporating the written trust
into the will-it is obvious that the will cannot dmbrace the
trdst in its altered form, since the doctrine of incorporation
'extends only to instruments in existence, or to the existing
form of an instrument, at the time of the will's execution. 184
If the matter could be treated as one involving facts of in-
dependent significance (and this is the view of the restate-
ment)'35 the trust and its amendments, if any, could be re-
garded as such facts and the pour-over would follow the
trust inany altered form. The courts, on the whole, however,
despite the logic of the concept of facts of independent
significance, have not accepted it to the extent. of per-
mitting the testamentary addition to follow the trust in
conformity with the changes made after the will.136 Since
the law is uncertain in South Carolina, it can be seen that
there need be no commitment either to the doctrine of in-
corporation by reference or of facts of independent signif-
icance to resolve the problem: the act creates it own doctrine.
Not only does the act permit a testamentary addition to
a revocable or amendable trust and the adaptation of the
134. Johnson v. Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. 305 (1851); Richardson v. Byrd,
166 S. C. 251, 164 S. E. 251 (1932).
135. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 54 (1959).
136. REPORTER'S NoTEs, RESTATEMENT (SECoND), TRUSTS § 54 (1959).
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pour-over to the altered form of the trust, but as a matter
of construction such a pour-over is to be governed, unless
the contrary intention is manifested in the will, by the trust
as it existed at the testator's death. If, however, the trust
to which the addition is made is that of another person, the
devised or bequeathed property will be dealt with as it
existed at the testator's death, and not afterwards, unless the
contrary appears. Care, therefore, should be taken when the
trust has been established by others to indicate, if it is so
desired, that the bequeathed or devised property may be
dealt with after the testator's death in accordance with any
changed terms of the trust; otherwise, the property, will be
"frozen" according to the terms of the trust as they exist
at the time of death.
The act further provides that the property added by the
will shall not be deemed to be held under a testamentary trust
of the testator, but to become part of the trust to which it is
added. Thus no new trust Is created; there is simply an
addition to one already in existence.
Where the trust is revocable and is revoked before the
death of the testator, oi where the trust otherwise terminates,
the act provides that the bequest or devise into it shall lapse.
Business Trusts
The 1961 General Assembly has enacted legislationl'T
affecting "business trusts," to fill the need for definitive
law on a subject that up to this time has not, in this state,
received judicial or legislative attention. Recent favorable
tax legislation has stimulated the formation and operation
of such trusts, particularly in the form of real estate invest-
ment trusts; and the 1961 act is designed to remove, in some
degree at least, uncertainty as to their status, and the status
of those who are associated in them, and to some extent to
regulate such trusts.
The business trust has been characterized as "a form of
association in which the associates attempt to secure cor-
porate advantages through the use of the device of the com-
mon law trust. The associates are of two kinds, trustees and
beneficiaries. The beneficiaries contribute the capital nec-
essary for an enterprise in return for transferable shares
137. Act No. 322 of 1961.
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of beneficial interests, entitling the holders to share- in
profits.' 38
The 1961 legislation is 'designed principally to remove
doubt as to the possible liability of the beneficiaries-share-
holders, in view of the holdings in sone states that attach
partnership liability to such shareholders, and in view 'of
the uncertainty apparent in other courts as to their precise
status and the character of the enterprise. 39 In any event
the present legislation recognizes the validity of the business
trust as something sui generis. The act specifically declares
that the liability of the trust shall extend to the whole of the
trust estate, or so much as may be necessary, to discharge its
liabilities, "but the instrument creating such trust may pro-
vide that no personal liability will attach to the individual
shareholders or trustees of the trust, and such provision shall
operate to limit the lability of the individual shareholders
and trustees as to the obligations of the trust itself, but pro-
vided in all cases the trustees shall be liable for breach of'
trust." 40
138. CRANE, PARTNERSHIP § 33 (2d. ed. 1952). Such a trust is some-
times called a "Massachussets trust," and is also called a "common law
trust." Another useful definition is "A business trust is an unincorporated
business organization by which property is to be held and managed by
trustees for the benefit and profit of such persons as may be or become
the holders of transferable certificates evidencing the beneficial interests
in the trust estate." 156 A. L. R. 22, 27 (1945).
139. See 156 A. L. R. 22 (1945).
140. It is to be noted that the act relieves the shareholders and the
trustees from personal liability if the instrument so provides. What the
result would be if the instrument contained no such provision is not
certain. It would be logical to assume that the basic law of trusts would
control, this being based on the prior assumption that, following the
overwhelming majority of cases, the trust would be treated as a trust,
rather than as a partnership, corporation, joint stock company or some
other form of organization. 156 A. L. R. 22 (1945). Under trust prin-
ciples the beneficiaries would not be personally responsible for obliga-
tions or liabilities incurred by the trustees. RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS §§ 274-276 (1959); 156 A. L. R. 22, 104 (1945). In this respect
the same result would follow as to liability of shareholders whether pro-
vided in the trust instrument or not. The case, however, would seemingly
be different as to the trustees if the instrument did not relieve them of
liability, since it is clearly the law that, absent a negativing of liability
by the trustee in the creation of obligations on behalf of the trust estate,
he incurs personal liability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 261-263
(1959). The South Carolina cases to the same effect are numerous. See,
among others, Moss v. Johnson, 36 S. C. 551, 15 S. E. 709 (1892) ; Porter
v. Jefferies, 40 S. C. 92, 18 S. E. 929 (1893); Law v. Blowers, 175 S. C.
469, 179 S. E. 480 (1935). That this is true as to business trusts, see
156 A. L. R. 22, 82 (1945). The exemption of the trustees by the act,
where the instrument so provides, seems to be a special application of
the principle that if the terms of the trust provide that liabilities shall
be discharged out of the trust estate or that the trustee shall not be
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The act further provides that every business trust shall
record the trust instrument and amendments in the office
of the clerk of court of the county in which it has its prin-
cipal place of business, and shall also file a certified copy with
the Secretary of State. It is further provided that real
estate may be acquired, conveyed and mortgaged by the
trust in the name used by it. There is also a provision that
the trust shall not be affected by any rule against per-
petuities.1
40 ,
The act further personalizes the trust by providing that
it may sue and be sued in the name by which it conducts its
business, and that service of process may be had upon it
in the same manner as upon corporations. By limiting re-
course on the trust's obligations to the property of the trust,
the near-corporate character-of the trust is also reflected.
In thus excluding liability on the part of the shareholders and
the trustees, restricting to the trust property the claims of
third parties, and permitting actions against the trust in its
name, it is believed that on liabilities incurred by or against
the trustees actions at law could be maintained directly
against the trust instead of having to proceed in equity
against the trust estate through subrogation to the trustees'
right of exoneration and indemnity.
141
liable, recourse may be had directly against the estate, in equity. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 270 (1959); 83 A. L. R. 616 (1933).
140a. Precautionary, but probably unnecessary, as least as to duration.
See 156 A. L. R. 22, 76 (1945).
141. See Guerry v. Capers, Bail. Eq. 159 (1830). There are several
basic requirements in South Carolina for the maintenance in equity of
a suit to reach trust property to satisfy obligations created by the
trustee: (1) the trustee's act must have been within the powers granted
by the trust; (2) it must have conferred a benefit on the trust estate;
(3) the trustee must be insolvent, so that direct resort at law against
him would be fruitless; (4) he must be in advance, not in default or
indebted, to the estate. Guerry v. Capers, supra; ,MNcKelvey v. Tate,
3 Rich. L. 339 (1832); Welsh v. Davis, 3 S. C. 110 (1871). What effect
an agreement negativing the trustee's liability, or a provision in the
trust exempting him from it, would have upon the requirements is not
clear. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 270, 271 (1959).
The emphasizing of "it is believed" is to indicate that this is merely
opinion. The fact that a trust is a business trust does not remove it
from the ordinary forms of process applicable to trusts generally: the
proceeding is in equity, even though there may be contractual disclaimer
of liability or provision in the instrument for it. See 156 A. L. R. 22, 82
(1945). Of course, a statute may provide otherwise; it may do so ex-
plicitly by providing that the property of the trust shall be subject to
execution, or it may otherwise make it plain that action at law is per-
mitted; or it may be a matter of fair implication that actions at law
are allowable. See 156 A. L. R. 22, 83-84 (1945). If an action at law
is permitted, some of the equitable requirements listed above would
probably not be necessary.
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Uniform Gift to Minors Act
The Uniform Act has been adopted by the 1961 General
Assembly, 142 to supersede the Model Gift to Minors Act,
143
which is expressly repealed. The Uniform Act, in addition
to possessing the virtue of uniformity, makes some useful
changes, which are not, however, of major importance.
Estate Tax Law
The enactment by the 1961 General Assembly of the Estate
Tax Law,144 replacing the inheritance tax law, carries with
it the repeal of several statutes dealing with certain pro-
cedures and incidents of estate administration, previously set
out in the inheritance tax chapter of the 1952 Code. The
statutes so repealed as part of the larger repeal are, however,
in the main re-enacted in substance in the estate tax law sec-
tions, and in no case is there any material change in admini-
stration procedure or with respect to the ordinary duties of
personal representatives.
Indentured Apprentices
Of interest, if not of importance, is the fact that the stat-
utes relating to apprentices have been repealed as obsolete.
45
Included in the statutes repealed are a pair 146 which treat
the term of service of an apprentice whose master has died
as assets in the hands of the decedent's personal represent-
ative and permit the representative to retain the apprentice
in his own service or to assign the indenture for the unex-
pired term of apprenticeship.
142. Act No. 330 of 1961.
143. Act No. 638 of 1956;CoDE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 62-501,
et seq., (1952).
144. Act No. 382 of 1961.
145. Act No. 95 of 1961, repealing CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
§§ 40-201 through 40-211 (1952).
146. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA §§ 40-210, 40-211 (1952).
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